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Abstract 
   M&A deals have increased with time as a result of ease of access to information, 
market liberalization and globalization as a whole. On a broader note, Cross-border 
M&A may also be seen as a current trend, one which is still to expand in the next few 
years. The benefits of Cross-border M&A extend to the economy in which the 
acquiring firm expands to and this can therefore be seen as a form of Foreign Direct 
Investment. 
   The liberalization of markets overall makes them integrated to some extent 
therefore imposing more pressure on the competitiveness of each firm. The 
Technology, Media & Telecommunications industry is one of the most competitive 
industries with rapid changes in technology which if not quickly adopted may cost 
firms in the industry their value and existence on the market. This work studies a real-
life deal that occurred this year, 2013 between Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. 
The acquirer Liberty Global Inc. like many firms, had the motive of expansion to its 
existing empire which is mainly across Europe.  
   This work assesses the worthiness of implementing the deal and prospects after the 
deal is made. After thorough assessment, it is then discovered that the deal and 24% 
premium paid are worthy as the target firm proves to be currently undervalued with 
great potential in the next five years. Cost synergies given the efficiency of operations 
mainly by the target firm are also a possibility. However, it is worth noting that all the 
discovered benefits are only to be realized provided that the merged firm is managed 
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    Over the past two decades, there has been a rapid volume increase in Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) activity as a result of deregulation, corporate integration and 
globalization. Cross-border M&A (CBMA) have since become a norm, with industries 
seizing investment opportunities and expanding operations on a global scale. This 
paper will define Cross-border M&A as that which occurs between firms with 
operations and headquarters in different countries and will study the case of a recently 
announced merger between Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. of which, both 
are prestigious and well governed firms in the telecommunications and television 
industry in their respective countries- the U.S and U.K. The prime objective is to 
analyze the impact of Cross-border M&A activity on both parties by valuation in order 
to realize any benefits and/or openings of any sort. The expansion of Liberty Global 
Inc. which will be further discussed is another essential to the study in order to see the 
effect of the newly added firm on the shareholders of its many others within and 
outside the US. 
   This paper will firstly discuss the different academic views, arguments, advances and 
contributions to the study of M&A activity, the valuation and its many influences and 
outcomes, with its main focus being in specific relation to Cross-border M&A. The 
methodology will then be based on these past arguments raised in the theoretical 
framework, of which valuation techniques are efficient, given the characteristics of the 
transaction at hand.  
   The second part of the paper will explore each of the firms and industry in detail 
including their corporate culture, performance and capital structure policy. The 
essence of this exploration is to use a well-tailored valuation procedure so as to obtain 
precision and a clearer understanding of what impacts the transaction will have on 
either or both firms. 
   Thereafter, individual valuation of both firms will be implemented with forecasts 
incorporating any firm-specific data in order to have a precise view of both firms’ 
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capacities. Lastly, the impact of the merger between the two firms will be analyzed by 
bringing together, the findings from separate valuation as well as assessing the 
worthiness of the merger consideration. 
2.    Literature Review 
   Cross-border M&A similar to domestic M&A, are driven mainly by the need for 
expansion and profitability strategies. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) provide 
clearer distinctions between cross-border and domestic transactions in that cross-
border M&A usually involve large acquirers, higher free cash flow, public targets, 
relative deal size, cash payments, tender offers and hostile takeovers. Mantecon 
(2009) finds that in terms of volume, cross-border M&A have increased to nearly three 
times as much as that of domestic M&A. Although the year 2011 had a plunge in M&A 
activity due to an economic downturn, the Grant Thornton International Business 
Report (2012) after a survey of 12,000 businesses in 40 economies established that 
34% continue to stand significantly interested in the activity compared to 2010 which 
only represented 26% of businesses globally.  
   Branching from early schools of thought on International Production, using an 
eclectic approach (Dunning, 1980), striking growth opportunities abroad induce 
participation in international investments, provided the right incentives. The company 
then markets its ownership-specific qualities such as organizational, technological or 
financial, among others, to foreign firms which are used to its advantage as entry 
modes (Pan and Tse, 2000). Recent studies in addition, also reveal that firms with high 
stock prices are more acquisitive both for the reason of growth and an extension to 
easier liquidity access (Mago, Marks, Matthews and Zenner, 2008); not forgetting the 
importance of technological innovation as the core of many strategies (Kim, Suh and 
You, 2013).  
   Participation in CBMA can however, be more challenging than domestic M&A as 
usually, international market forces or drivers may be unknown. The acquiring firms 
may face a legal system that supports property rights different from that of its home 
which may be a threat to future cash flows (Rossi and Volpin, 2004); this type of 
uncertainty also known as ‘’liability of foreignness’’ (Zaheer, 1995). Additionally, more 
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disclosure of information or unfamiliar accounting practices may be encountered 
during the due diligence process (Mantecon, 2009). Past academic research dated back 
to the 70s, studied CBMA in an economic framework as a form of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) with examples of Dunning (1993) and Williamson (1975). Put this 
way, Froot and Stein (1991) establish that with information asymmetry, there is a 
significant correlation between FDI and foreign exchange rates. On the other hand, 
Hitt, Shimizu, Vaidyanath and Vincenzo (2004) dispute the economic framework 
stating its limited insight for M&A implementation processes and therefore argue that 
there’s need for additional insights as well as wide-ranging emphases.  
   Akin to other transactions, M&A players incur costs during the process such as 
contracting, auditing and legal advice fees. However, CBMA have higher information 
asymmetry leading to costs higher than would be in a domestic transaction (Luo, Suh 
and Zhao, 2004). Many academics argue on whether on average, CBMA yield positive 
or negative returns regarding expectations of corporate managers and analysts. The 
first argument of information asymmetry and resulting costs has been recently tackled 
by Ragazzino, Reur and Shenker (2004) who suggest that the risk may be reduced by 
simply changing the deal structure during the evaluation process. Unsurprisingly, 
Williamson (1975, 1979) on the notion of Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) which 
basically relates entry mode choice as a macroeconomic threat to company 
governance, had earlier argued in a similar manner by recommending an 
organizational structure designed in a way such that risks are minimized. Developing 
aforementioned literature on reduction in asymmetric information, Boeh (2011) 
studies a sample of over 3,000 M&A deals of both types- domestic and cross-border in 
which he incorporates contracting costs borne and time taken to execute the deals.  
    From this assessment, it is concluded that CBMA compared to domestic are more 
costly yet take shorter execution time. This is probably due to the level of asymmetry 
involved in CBMA transactions as stated by Luo et al. (2004). It is worth noting 
however, that the given literature so far proposes further research on cost reduction 
mechanisms implemented in CBMA transactions (Boeh, 2011). 
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   Given the main motives and the greatest risk faced in CBMAs as noted by academics, 
the following section which will discuss in detail M&A procedure, expectations, 
valuation and outcome from previous studies. 
2.1.      An insight on M&A 
   In order to understand an outcome of any transaction, one must closely analyze the 
whole procedure from motives, considerations of the transaction and the valuation 
procedure. M&A usually take the following categories: i) horizontal where competitors 
or same industry level firms combine; ii) vertical where firms have a buyer-seller 
relationship, for example, a distribution firm can merge with its main supplier; and iii) 
conglomerate where firms neither have an industrial nor buyer-seller relationship. The 
latter is often associated with diversification. 
2.2.     Motives of M&A 
   As stated earlier, the board, management and its shareholders usually feel the need 
to extend their knowledge base, productivity and competitiveness for returns of 
growth in different aspects. Gӧrg, Hijzen and Manchin (2008) using a sample of OECD 
countries,  find that the number of mergers increases in both the market size of the 
acquisition and the target country; and that mergers are positively affected by the size 
of financial markets in both countries.  
Synergy 
   In all transactions, the one word that management have in mind is Synergy; which is 
‘’…the additional value that is generated by combining two firms, creating 
opportunities that would not been available to these firms operating independently.’’ 
(Damodaran, 2005). Damodaran (2005) further classifies this additional value into two 
groups: operational and financial. Operational synergy involves the value added by 
combination of firms in terms of cost efficiency, profitability, higher growth and 
market power. While, financial synergy captures tax benefits, increase in value, debt 
capacity and diversification. Synergies imply that the value of the merged firms after 
the merger announcement should be actually greater than that during consideration. 
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Realized synergies should however be split among the parties and in order to be done 
fairly the strengths brought forth by each firm are considered as the underlying 
measure. This therefore means the larger proportion is allocated to the firm which 
contributes the most in order to realize the determined synergies (Damodaran, 2005). 
   Academics have closely studied the types of synergy, creating empirical evidence 
such as the likes of Berger and Ofek (1995) and Maquiera, Megginson, and Nail (1998) 
who find that diversification is only beneficial if the deals have related fields of 
business or operation. Devos, Kadapakkan and Krishnamurthy (2009) study a set of 264 
large mergers and find that operational synergies are higher in focused mergers while 
tax savings generate a larger portion of gains in diversifying mergers.  
    The main evidence drawn by the authors is that gains are well derived from mergers 
with improvement in resource allocation. The other motives are true depending on 
either sides of the parties involved whether the bidder, or the target. This will be 
explained further after understanding the nature of the case study. 
2.3.      The due-diligence process 
   Similar to domestic M&A, CBMA have to examine their target and all its operational 
activities in order to have a definite background and information on the overall value 
and risk. Earlier work by Kish, Madura and Vasconcellos (1991) branch their findings 
from capital budget theory concluding that CBMA decisions are based on an asset 
valuation model. Recently, Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) established that valuation 
plays a major role in rousing mergers; firms that tend to be acquirers are usually those 
that have experienced a rise in stock market value, have currency appreciation and 
relatively high book-to-market values, while those with weaker economic performance 
tend to be targets. 
   However, CBMA as seen in the theoretical framework is more complex and involves 
more factors, hence resulting in crucial considerations. Angwin (2001) points out 
corporate and national cultural differences and how they can affect perception of the 
parties involved and the value of the deal. Corporate cultural differences include 
organizational routines, managerial practices and styles, communication systems; 
while national imply on a large scale: individual values, risk propensity, acceptance of 
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uncertainty, among others (Hitt et al., 2004). Influence of the aforementioned should 
therefore be closely considered in valuation. 
2.4.     Valuation Techniques 
   The assessment of how much an investment is actually worth is very essential in 
every form of transaction. In M&A, as mentioned earlier, firms are valued in order to 
give precise information to decision-makers on their investment.  Overtime, a number 
of valuation techniques have developed, with improvements in some. Pandian and 
Woodlock (2013) point out three types of valuation; the asset method, guideline 
method and income method. In detail, the asset method values a firm on its net assets 
which is the difference between the market value of assets and liabilities. On the other 
hand, the guideline method uses market prices of comparable firms in order to obtain 
a price for the firm being valued while the income method uses estimates of a firm’s 
future cash flows incorporating the risk associated with them. The Discounted Cash 
Flow model (DCF) , established in the 70s may be seen as the core of valuation as other 
methods rely on it directly or indirectly to obtain the present value of assets, so as to 
have better insight on the deal. Of the three types of valuation, the income method is 
popularly used and is can be comprehended as a development of the DCF model. It is 
therefore important to study the developments of this model and the different 
parameters it captures. 
2.5.      The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Model 
   Traditional valuation theory defines valuation as a function of three prime factors, 
which are cash, timing and risk. The DCF approach implies that the value of a business 
is the sum of its expected future free cash flows, discounted at an appropriate rate 
that reflects the cost of capital. Luehrman (1997a) shows how the model is built from a 
simple relationship between the present and future values branching from the 
following basic financial concept: 
          ; Which then yields the relationship: 
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Where; FV is the Future value, PV is the present value and r is the interest rate. 
When applying the fundamental relationship to a business, the present value equals 
the sum of the future cash flows adjusted for timing and risk: 
    ∑
      
      
 
   
 
Where;    in this case corresponds to        which are expected cash flows or future 
cash flows and k is a discount rate which incorporates a risk premium.  
   The expected future cash flows are discounted at a rate with a risk premium because 
the cash flow pattern is uncertain and to compensate for the risk, investors demand a 
higher return. The DCF model requires short and long-term cash flow projection 
(usually 4 to 10 years) in order to execute valuation of the firm. The cash flows include 
new investments, revenues and expenses. To be more precise, Free Cash Flows to the 
firm (FCF or FCFF) are used which are earnings after tax, including depreciation net of 
capital expenditure and working capital. The estimates of short and long-term growth 
and return on invested capital should be essential to the FCFs being projected as a firm 
is expected to grow over time or renovate via occurring reinvestments. In addition to 
that, forecasted FCFs should be made considering any changes such as synergies, 
economies of scale, expected overhead reductions and changes in strategy. 
   Projection of FCFs cannot be made on a large time scale which thus explains why it is 
usually between four to ten years. A terminal value is therefore required to denote the 
present value after the forecast period of all FCFs generated by a firm. This can be 
written as: 
    
      
   
 
Where;        is the terminal value and g being the growth rate; the terminal value 
can be obtained by estimating the future value of the last projected FCF at time T, 
     , using the expected growth rate after the forecast period i.e. 
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Note: assuming that,  , the growth rate after the forecast period, is perpetual. 
2.6.      The Cost of Capital and risk parameters 
   The DCF model although widely used has academic dispute concerning what discount 
rate to use. From this arise two different DCF valuation methods which are the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)-based DCF and Adjusted Present Value 
(APV) which uses the unlevered cost of equity and the cost of financing separately.  
WACC is a tax-adjusted discount rate that is meant to capture the value of tax benefits 
that are gained from debt financing, subsequently reducing the discount rate 
(Luehrman, 1997a). It is denoted as follows: 
      
 
 
    
 
 




 is the equity-firm value ratio, 
 
 
 the debt-firm value ratio,    the cost of 
equity,    the cost of debt and    is the marginal corporate tax rate.  
   The opportunity costs,    and   , are each comprised of a risk premium and time 
value. The time value is the return one earns for not bearing any risk over time. This 
implies that they are both risk adjusted. It is important to note that the costs should be 
current, reflecting current financial market conditions and not sunk or historical costs. 
In addition to that, they should equal investors’ expected internal rates of return on 
future cash flows respective of each form of capital and weights should be based on 
market-value mixes of debt and equity (Bruner, Eades, Harris, and Higgins, 1998). 
   The cost of debt,    , the rate at which funding was borrowed can be decomposed 
simply yielding the sum of the current risk-free rate and a default spread. Where the 
default spread is obtained from the corresponding credit rating set. In a case where 
bonds have different ratings, the median rating may be used (Damodaran, 2013). 
The cost of equity    is denoted as follows when using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM): 
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Where;    is the risk-free rate,     the equity beta which is the sensitivity of the firm’s 
equity to market patterns and         is the equity risk premium- the difference 
between the expected return and the risk-free rate.  The risk-free rates are obtained 
from Government securities. An investment is risk-free if it neither has default risk nor 
reinvestment risk (Damodaran, 2013) or as stated by CAPM, if it has a zero  . It further 
implies that an expected return with a   of one is equal to the market return. The beta 
is estimated by regressing returns against market returns while historical risk 
premiums are used. Collectively, the CAPM can be defined as a linear model used to 
assess the cost of capital centered around the expected return on its assets, 
incorporating the firm’s risk in relation to that of the market and it’s underlying 
assumption being that investors hold a well-diversified portfolio. 
   The CAPM, developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) still stands, for almost half 
a century, as the most common method in cost of capital estimation and portfolio 
performance evaluation. Conversely, academia have overtime, developed faults in the 
use of the model. Faults include; imperfect measures of the market portfolio, non-
normality of returns, deviating borrowing and lending rates, tax effects and the lack of 
existence of a pure riskless asset. Of all arguments, one still stands- Roll (1977) 
disputes the possibility of observing the Market Portfolio and concludes that it’s thus 
impossible to test the validity of the CAPM, and opts for the Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
(APT) established by Ross (1976) which allows additional factors; mostly 
macroeconomic with factor specific betas for a fair estimation of discount rates. 
Dayala (2012) finds Roll’s critique significant in that CAPM still reflects invalidity and 
suggests further investigation. However, Roll’s critique can also be used as a guideline 
to determine whether the portfolio market is Mean-Variance Efficient (MVE) 
depending on whether CAPM tests hold or not. 
    Basu (1977) additionally points out strong evidence that the beta misses variation in 
expected return captured by other variables. Scholars of behavioural finance question 
the assumptions of homogeneity in investor rationality and market efficiency in the 
face of future uncertainty (Miller, 1977; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1997). Fama and French have in their work (1992, 
1996 and 2004), have since found stronger evidence against the CAPM and have 
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modified the model according to the average-return anomalies missed by it. The 
model is a three-factor model of which, excess market return is one of the added 
factors. The inclusion proves its importance and is crucial as it captures robust 
common time-series variation in returns. They further advise using the CAPM as an 
introduction to Portfolio Theory because of its simplicity and from there, more 
complex and extensive models may be used such as the Intertemporal Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (ICAPM) by Merton (1973) which incorporates more variability factors 
such as state variables and wealth and can provide a better description of average 
returns.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that the perceived limitations of the 
CAPM are mostly a result of the way in which the model is applied; mainly in 
estimating the risk premium and the beta (Pettit, 1999).      Despite the many disputes 
of the model, CAPM is still fundamental in understanding Performance Evaluation and 
Portfolio Management, can be used as a benchmark and is also a foundation of the 
alternative models that have been established overtime. 
 Risk-free rate and the Equity Risk Premium (ERP) 
   ERP implies that the expected return on a portfolio exceeds the risk-free rate.  
Finance theory states intuitively the relationship between investment returns and risk- 
the riskier the investment, the higher return expected or demanded by investors 
(Damodaran, 2012). The choice of the risk-free rate to be used is essential as it 
determines the size of the ERP included in the cost of equity (Pandian and Woodlock, 
2012). Bruner et al (1998) after a survey of leading corporations and financial advisors 
in the US, recommend that the risk-free should be well-tailored with the cash flows 
being valued and conclude that for most corporate acquisitions and projects, the yield 
on the US government bond with maturity of at least ten years would be appropriate.    
However, the use of current yields on US Treasuries as a proxy measure of risk-free 
rates of return has been highly doubted after the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) recent debt 
downgrade. Booth (1999) measured total bond risk using standard deviation of returns 
over 20 years and from this discovered that over time, there has been a significant 
increase and at times has almost equaled that of equity. The demand for the use of the 
US Treasuries still stands relatively high thus suggesting it being a haven or ‘’risk-free’’ 
if so, although longer-term average yields should be used until the current unrest 
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stabilizes (Pandian and Woodlock, 2012). Failure to adjust risk-free rates may result in 
overvaluation when measured from historical norms. In order to obtain a risk-free rate 
for CBMA valuation, forward rates and the riskless rate are used in an index currency 
to estimate the riskless rate in the local currency, taking into account the inflation rate 
as the analysis should be in real terms. 
   The standard approach for ERP estimation is by use of historical data where actual 
returns earned on equity over a period of time are obtained as well as returns on a 
risk-free asset from which the difference between the two is computed to yield a 
historical risk premium (Damodaran, 2012). Damadoran questions the efficiency of this 
model and further suggests an alternative way which adjusts for country-specific risk. 
Grabowski (2009) in concurrence with Damodaran, point out that ERP is cyclical during 
the business cycle and therefore rename ERP as ‘conditional ERP’, implying it changing 
according to whether there’s a boom or recession in the cycle. Bruner et al (1998) add 
that the choice of an ERP is a subject of controversy concerning its value and 
estimation. From their survey, most of the best-practice companies were found to use 
a premium of 6% or lower while financial advisors and many texts were seen to use 
higher rates. Prospective equity risk premiums which can be derived by use of 
expected future, dividend yields, analyst consensus, estimates of future growth in 
nominal and real earnings, average payout ratios, and current stock market valuations 
as well as surveys (as seen by Bruner et al, 1998) can be used as an alternative 
(Pandian and Woodlock, 2012). 
   Applying this to CBMA valuation with the risks faced, it should be taken into account 
that historical premiums vary across economic cycles and the difference between 
estimation techniques of ERP will yield different results. If the risks in question are 
non-diversifiable and not captured by the beta used in the cross-border project, then a 
risk premium should be incorporated in the discount rate. For practicality’s sake, it is 
safer to adjust the discount rate by adding a premium in order to reduce any 
distortions of the true value of the project (Froot and Kester, 1995). 
Beta Estimation 
   Beta measures the relative movement of the business’ excess returns on equity with 
that of the market. The market returns are normally measured using indices such as 
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S&P 500, NASDAQ, FTSE, CAC40 etc., respective of where equity is being invested and 
listed. The standard procedure for beta estimation involves regression of stock returns 
on market returns. However, this is usually associated with a high standard error, the 
firm’s business mix that’s reflected is not the current one but that of the period of the 
regression and the average leverage shown is not the current one but, as with the 
business mix, is over the period of regression (Damodaran, 2013). In order to correct 
this, Bruner et al (1998) suggest practical compromise such as an increase in the 
number of time periods used so as to improve the statistical reliability of the estimate 
yet caution should be taken as ‘stale and irrelevant’ information may be included. 
Shortening the observation period from monthly to weekly or daily on the other hand, 
will increase the sample size but  result in observations that are not normally 
distributed and additionally, unwanted random noise. The choice of a market index is 
also a practical compromise in that it is an ‘unobservable portfolio’ consisting of all 
risky assets. Kaplan and Peterson (1998) recommend the use of a cluster of firms in the 
industry similar to that being evaluated so as to obtain a more precise beta as 
individual firm beta estimation as established by academia, has a high concentration of 
statistical noise. It is important to note nonetheless that for firms that operate on a 
large scale, it is more difficult to collect well-matched clusters. 
   Financial theory decomposes a firm’s beta defining it as a composition of operating 
risk and financial risk. Financial risk is faced when a firm is levered and an increase in 
leverage results in a high beta. Hamada’s (1972) denotation of the levered beta is 
popularly used and written as follows: 




Where;    is the levered beta,    the unlevered beta (also known as the Asset beta),  
   is the marginal corporate tax and 
 
 
  is the ratio of debt to equity. Inferring from the 
given formula, the unlevered beta is always lower than the levered beta complying 
with the traditional notion of higher risk being associated with higher leverage. 
   Applying this to M&A valuation, beta decompositions should be routinely performed 
during the due-diligence process. CBMA have overall, a lower beta given that country-
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specific non-diversifiable risk may prove diversifiable in the context of a global market 
portfolio. The beta differs according to the market portfolio used in estimation (Froot 
and Kester, 1995). 
Drawing from the derivations discussed thus far, the two types of DCF valuation will 
now be reviewed.  
2.6.1. WACC-based DCF vs. Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
WACC-based DCF 
   The standard financial firm valuation technique has been the WACC-based DCF. Like 
other discount rates, it is adjusted in order to capture any value generated or 
destroyed by the financing of a project (Luehrman, 1997a). The value,    , of a project 
or firm using this valuation technique is calculated in two steps as follows: 
i) PV of Planning Period- this is the present value of the cash flows during the 
projection, year t to T. 
   ∑
    
         
 
   
 
ii) Value of Residual Cash flows (Terminal Value)- this is the value of the 
residual cash flows in year T, which begin in year T+1. 
    
      
   
 
            The present value of the TV is estimated as follows: 
     
  
         
 
                         The value is then:                      
   This technique has fewer computations yet with current computing software, is 
only suitable for the simplest and most static of structures. Ezzell and Miles (1980) 
argue in favor of WACC provided that the firm maintains a constant debt-to-equity 
ratio in market value, of which Inselbag and Kaufold (1997) prove. Luehrman 
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(1997a) advises that the application of WACC to firms with complex tax positions 
will yield poor results and is more unrealistic in cases such as cross-border capital 
budgeting problems. Since WACC by computation assumes the capital structure of 
the project or firm being valued i.e. the target, will be constant over time, Froot 
and Kester (1995) recommend re-estimation of the WACC for each period to 
account for the changes in the target’s capital structure. This in earlier years of the 
field of Finance would have been a tedious procedure nevertheless given 
sophisticated software it can be used if still preferred although it then defeats its 
purpose. However, if the patterns are known in advance, it may be better to 
implement the APV method. 
APV (or Valuation in Parts) 
   This technique separates the effects of the capital structure on value from the 
estimation of asset values. This very useful for complex investments so as to 
decompose cash flows in order to have precision on what effects each financial 
maneuver has. The valuation is as follows: 
i) Base Case Value- the firm is valued as though it were 100% equity financed. 
To do this, the firm’s equity beta,    is unlevered to obtain the asset 
beta,    as shown below: 
      
 
 
                or             
 
         
 
              The asset beta is then used to obtain the cost of assets, kA using CAPM: 
                 
    Given the cost of assets, the FCFs can be discounted by it using the traditional 
DCF model to obtain the value, VU, which is the all-equity value of the firm. 
ii) Financing Side Effects- these include interest tax shields, costs of financial 
distress, subsidies, hedges, issue costs and any other costs that may 
exclusively have an impact on the value, VU. Expected tax savings are 
denoted as:       . The present value of tax shields is estimated according 
to the debt scenario given. 
 
M&A: A Case Study on Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. | Elsa Nabenge 15 
 
If absolute debt,  is expected to remain stable, then the expected tax 
savings,       are discounted by the cost of debt,     yielding; 
         . 
If relative debt, 
 
 
 is expected to be stable, then the expected tax savings, 
      are discounted by the cost of assets,    therefore yielding; 
 
      
     
  
 
                    Therefore, APV is the sum of the separate valuation: 
                                             
   Deducing from the valuation, it is seen that APV is more informative as it gives a clear 
picture of where the value comes from. The discount rates used contain nothing but 
time value and a risk premium respective of the cash flows being discounted 
(Luehrman, 1997b). Inselbag and Kaulfold (1997) suggest that it is more practical to 
apply the APV technique when firms target absolute levels of debt outstanding in the 
future while the WACC is more efficient when firms plan to maintain the relative level 
of debt in the future. 
Valuation of CBMA 
   Applying both techniques to cross-border valuation require caution because of the 
differences in currency which can have a weighty impact on the NPV of the deal, cost 
of capital, and the level and volatility of future financial performance (Pettit, 
2004).  Therefore, differentials between long-term riskless interest rates in the 
countries being valued should be used to convert discount rates in order to match the 
respective denomination, whether home or foreign.  The use of this implies the 
difference in the time value of money between the two currencies Froot and Kester 
(1995). The cost of capital will then be calculated as follows: 
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(          )            
            
         
 
Where          is the foreign-denominated cost of capital,       the home-
denominated cost of capital and 
            
         
 is the interest differential. 
          and       are the nominal yields during the investment period on 
comparable-risk home- and foreign-denominated debt respectively (Froot and Kester, 
1995). The cost of capital computed captures any currency risk associated with the 
given forex rate. Given a risky currency, while the other is constant means interest 
rates denominated in the risky currency will be higher than the comparable currency. 
   If given the case of foreign-denominated cash flows and there is need to discount 
them to home-denominated cash flows, the interest differential is used once more in 
order to generate the exchange rate to be used for cash flow conversion. This 
approach is useful in cases where the foreign investment’s value in home currency is 
sensitive to exchange rates and a sensitivity analysis is required. It can also be used in 
cases where the computation of the cost of capital is more complex to determine than 
future exchange rates, and is computed as follows: 
            [
         




Where;           is the expected exchange rate in the next period(s),     the spot rate, 
  the number of years forward and 
         
            
 is the factor that determines the annual 
change in the exchange rate. 
Quoted interbank forward rates may be used in conversion yet are problematic as 
reliable quotes for most currencies are usually only available for a limited number of 
periods into the future (Froot and Kester, 1995). 
   It is important to note that this paper will not showcase the asset method and the 
guideline method in detail as with mere M&A procedure, the DCF technique still 
stands as the most convenient and efficient. However, the additional use of the 
guideline method is considered handy in performance analysis provided that the 
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comparable is well-matched within the industry (Kaplan and Ruback, 1996). Goedhart, 
Koller and Wessels (2005) nonetheless advise that finding firms with the right criteria 
for comparable values is challenging as industries are loosely identified and conclude 
that the DCF method stands the most reliable.  Given the case of cross-border 
valuation, more parameters are involved- the more the expansion of firms, the larger 
the variation in growth rates, capital structure and other returns therefore making 
valuation complex, requiring close and informative valuation.  
After the costs pointed out under the insight on M&A, and the valuation techniques 
are shown, the question still stands- whether M&A are worth the current global hype 
and how the transactions are paid for. 
2.7.   M&A, CBMA Consideration and the price they pay 
   M&A transactions may be paid for wholly with cash or securities- stock or 
debentures, or a combination of both cash and securities.  Payment with use of stock 
may use a fixed or floating exchange rate; where the use of a floating rate involves an 
offer of stock value in absolute currency terms while the fixed rate an offer of a 
number of shares by made by the bidder. Most M&A are fixed exchange transactions 
where the number of acquirer shares to be exchanged for a target shares is revealed 
during the merger announcement. The release of new information has an impact on 
stock prices depending on investors’ sentiments. In the case of floating exchange rates, 
the number of shares to be exchanged is determined three months, after the 
announcement of the deal, known as the pricing period (Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford, 
2004). Mitchell et al (2004) with a sample of 2,130 announced M&A between 1994 and 
2000, further establish that the reaction to floating exchange rate deals is positive 
upon announcement yet drifts to an average of -3.2% during the pricing  period as it is 
indeterminate whether the deal consideration is approved or not. Securities-only 
transactions may, however bring about uncertainty on the seller’s end and therefore, a 
mix of both cash and securities is optimal. Additionally, there is over-payment and a 
strong link between negative price shocks when M&A deals are security-financed due 
to portfolio rebalancing as opposed to cash-financed deals. This destroys shareholder 
value for the acquiring firm (Mitchell et al, 2004). Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) 
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after studying a sample of publicly-traded US-based firms, find that acquiring firms 
that use at least some stock to finance their deals significantly have three-day average 
abnormal returns of -1.5% while those that don’t use stock have abnormal returns of 
0.4%.  
   Moreover, target firms’ shareholders are better-off when there is no stock-financing 
in the transaction with three-day average abnormal returns slightly over 20% and 13% 
for stock-financed transactions. In addition, Hazelkorn and Zenner (2004) from their 
empirical analysis of 1,500 non-US financial transactions, conclude that the market 
reacted more positively to cash-financed acquisitions than to stock-financed 
acquisitions in both the short and long run as this shows more confidence in the 
acquiring firm’s future cash flows. However, use of cash leaves the acquiring firm’s 
shareholders bearing all the risk than with use of stock. Christofferson, McNish, and 
Sias (2004) prove that mergers achieve cost synergies more often than revenue 
synergies and sequential acquirers have a higher chance of succeeding than first-time 
acquirers.  
   In accordance with payment, the acquiring firm has to pay a premium over the price 
to settle the deal. Premiums are based on historical market values, strategic 
considerations and estimated synergies. Premiums are said to be worth it provided 
that the value of synergies realized is greater. Sahni and Sirower (2006) come up with a 
benchmark which shows how much of the firm’s is at risk assuming no synergies are 
realized after the acquisition, which they call Shareholder Value at Risk (SVAR). The 
SVAR is simply computed as follows: 
 
      
                   
                                       
 
 
Concluding with Hazelkorn and Zenner’s (2004) drawings; ‘acquisitions of foreign 
companies and assets created more shareholder value than domestic acquisitions, 
suggesting that the synergies and benefits underlying overseas expansion have been a 
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2.8.  Conclusion 
   Different perspectives have been highlighted in this chapter from different 
academics and researchers with the main motive explaining the essence of M&A deals 
and why firms are highly driven to participate. However, the realization of pre-deal 
expectations are proven based on the structure of the parties involved in the deal and 
what type of deal whether vertical or horizontal. It’s nevertheless important to 
emphasize the conclusion of Devos et al (2009) which is that regardless of the 
structure or nature of the deal, given efficient resource allocation by management, 
synergies may actually be realized reducing the SVAR.  
   M&A deals are all expected to add value or maintain that which exists. In the same 
way, CBMA may also be looked at not only beneficial to the firms involved, but the 
economy in which the deal is made, as a type of FDI. Cross Border M&A have more 
sophisticated details in contrast to domestic deals therefore making the valuation 
process more involving with a call for vigilance. Provided this, the aforementioned APV 
valuation when applied in this work will carry a greater weight regardless of the results 
the other valuations yield. 
    Given the literature and overview of M&A and CBMA, the following section analyses 
the firms involved in one of the pronounced biggest deals in the cable industry 
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3. Firm and Industry Review 
   Telecommunications, Technology and Media (TTM) Industry is currently highly 
concentrated yet large media/telecommunications firms known over the past 
decade(s) still stand as the strongest, most influential and most competitive. The 
industry demands for many factors with consistent improvement over time in order to 
maintain competitiveness and client loyalty and credibility. Given the firms at hand, 
this section will give an insight on the firms involved and the industry of operation in 
their respective countries/regions.  
3.1.   Liberty Global Inc. (LGI), (Ticker: LBTY) 
   Liberty Global Inc., US-based and established in 2005 as a merger between Liberty 
Media and UGC, is an international provider of video, broadband internet and 
telephony services, serving 19.8 million customers, both residential- and business-
based across 13 countries, primarily in Europe and Chile. Its business strategy has a 
higher weight of emphasis on superior organic growth, opportunistic M&A activity and 
commitment to superior equity returns which is done through an appropriate leverage 
mix and constant equity repurchases. It is listed on NASDAQ and its operations are run 
through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Liberty Global Europe Holding BV (Liberty Global 
Europe) where European countries include; Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Switzerland; 
while other countries of operation are from Latin America- Chile and Puerto Rico 
(Liberty Global Inc., 2012).   
   The cable-provider multinational firm’s services to European countries cover 
broadband networks and leads in most of the markets of operation. Under Liberty 
Global Europe is a wholly-owned subsidiary, UPC BV Holding, which provides the 
aforementioned services to nine European countries; Austria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Ireland,  Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Switzerland; and Chile.  
Other subsidiaries are wholly-owned Unitymedia KabelBW in Germany, and majority-
owned Telenet in Belgium.  Services provided to countries of operation in Latin 
America are under VTR Global Com SA, a subsidiary that is 80%-owned in Chile, and 
Liberty Global Puerto Rico a 60%-owned subsidiary in Puerto Rico. Liberty Global’s 
consolidated programming interests in both Europe and Latin America are primarily 
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held by another wholly-owned Liberty Global Europe subsidiary, Chellomedia BV, 
which also owns or manages investments in other businesses mainly in Europe (Liberty 
Global Inc., 2012).   
3.1.1. Financials 
   Liberty Global Inc. is a highly leveraged firm with an increase in the year 2012 
resulting in a debt-to-capital ratio of 93.55% (Bloomberg, 2013), of which most is at 
subsidiary level and is not liable to LGI as the parent. LGI has 85% of its total debt due 
2017 and thereafter and managed to reduce fully-swapped borrowing costs by 80 basis 
points dropping to a year-over-year of 7.2%.  The increase in debt in the preceding 
year was mainly due to the closing of its Puerto Rican OneLink transaction. In order to 
suffice attractive equity returns without incorporating unexpected risk, LGI targets a 
consolidated leverage level between four to five times of its consolidated operating 
cash flow. It is important to note however that timing of acquisitions and financing 
transactions may drift the level from the target. The year 2012 ended with the 
adjusted ratio of consolidated debt to that of annualized consolidated operating cash 
flows being 5.3x, while the ratio of consolidated net debt (which is total debt less cash 
and cash equivalents) to annualized consolidated operating cash flows was 4.7x 
(Liberty Global Inc., 2012a).   
   LGI’s consolidated liquidity at the end of the financial year 2012, was approximately 
$5.3 billion, including adjusted cash of $3.1 billion (of which $1.8 billion was at the 
parent level) and $2.2 billion in aggregate borrowing capacity as per credit facility. The 
firm’s ability to service or refinance debt and to maintain compliance with leverage 
covenants in credit agreements and indentures of its subsidiaries predominantly rests 
on its capacity to sustain or increase the operating cash flow of its operating 
subsidiaries, and achievement of sufficient returns on capital expenditure and 
acquisitions (Liberty Global Inc., 2012b). 
   Liberty Global’s financial year ended 31st December 2012 had recorded consolidated 
revenue of $10.3 billion with an 8.4% year-over-year growth rate of which, as shown in 
Figure 1, UPC maintained its place as the highest in growth and revenue generation  
over the  4- year trend. The surge of revenue from the firm’s preceding financial year 
was mainly due to the positive contributions of acquisitions, primarily KabelBW as well 
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as the Revenue Generating Units’ (RGU) organic growth of 34%. Adjusting for impacts 
of foreign exchange and acquisition, the rebased year-over-year revenue growth rate 
of the year 2012 was at 5.8%, which is seen to have increased by 1% compared to the 
year 2011, making it the best top-line performance in five years. 
Figure 1. LGI Revenue: Segment Information 
 
Source: Liberty Global Annual Report, 2011; 2012. 
   The firm’s products have, overall increased total organic additions i.e. RGU organic 
additions (see appendix), of which over the trend, the television unit has performed 
the worst in  video subscription although improving by 7% as a result of the launch of 
Horizon TV in 2012, the unit is still yielding losses at net additional success level. The 
telephony and broadband units on the other hand, have maintained upright growth 
over the trend and reveal year-over-year growth of 32% and 19% respectively (Liberty 
Global, 2012b). 
   Liberty Global’s operating cash flow had an upward growth in the same manner as its 
revenue of 4% after adjustments made of acquisition and foreign exchange effects and 
operating cash flow margin 10 basis points up to 42.7% compared to the previous year. 
The year over year growth increase was mainly from Western Europe operations as a 
result of its consolidation of Kabel BW of which businesses in Germany, Ireland and the 
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   The increase in revenue year by year has a corresponding expense of marketing its 
products i.e. advertising, delivery of mobile handsets to retail locations and third-party 
sales commissions. The cost of goods sold (CoGS) includes programming, network 
operations, interconnect, customer operations, customer care, stock-based 
compensation expense and other direct costs,  while SG&A include human resources, 
information technology, general services, management, finance, legal and sales and 
marketing costs, stock-based compensation and other general expenses. CoGS have 
over the trend, only increased by 1% relative to its respective revenue in the 
corresponding financial year, as shown in Figure 2. Interest expenses have, compared 
to 2009 increased due to higher average outstanding debt of which some costs of 
borrowing have reduced by 80 basis points as stated earlier. Liberty Global has 
however, currently issued €500 million ($660 million) of 5.125% senior secured notes 
in Germany with the proceeds to be used to refinance its existing 8.125% senior 
secured notes. The slight increase in other expenses reflects the impact of the firm’s 
M&A activity including stock-based compensation (Liberty Global, 2012b). 
   Although Liberty Global has had an upward-oriented revenue growth rate and 
EBITDA with a CAGR of 11% over the 4-year trend, Figure 3 shows that net income has 
been relatively low with losses in years 2009 and the most in 2011 which was a result 
of interest payments on its high leverage and foreign exchange risk.  The financial year 
ended 2012 brought forth, close to a 200% growth in net income making it positive 
primarily due to progressive acquisition impacts and better foreign transactions 
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Figure 2. LGI Expenses/Revenue comparison: 2009 and 2012 
 
Source: Liberty Global Annual Report, 2009; 2012. 
 
Figure 3. LGI Consolidated Financial Performance 
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   The financial year 2012 for LGI reported a decrease in CAPEX of $43 million 
compared to the corresponding prior year due to working capital efforts as non-cash 
vendor financing and capital lease arrangements were $170 million higher year-over-
year. 
Figure 4. LGI Capital Expenditure 
 
Source: Liberty Global Annual Report, 2011;2012. 
   Given the financials, Liberty Global with its borrowing capacity, liquidity, access to 
capital markets and operating momentum expects a continuation in growth of RGUs, 
improvement in its products, potential use of excess capital including primarily, M&A 
activity and stock buybacks. The firm continues to incorporate competitive and 
economic factors in its markets of operation and the availability of accretive M&A 
opportunities and the impact of  M&A activity on its operations and financial 
performance, and other updated information and statements. It is worth noting 
however that activities and operations are exposed to a level of risk and may not yield 
results as expected in forth-coming years. The risks include most importantly, 
subscription of customers which may be maintained by technological improvement of 
products and advanced offerings in order to capture potential subscription 
subsequently increasing RGUs over time. Other risks include law and regulation of 
which can be minimized by compliance in order to close acquisitions and dispositions 
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3.1.2.   Stock Market Performance 
   Liberty Global has its stock listed and traded on the NASDAQ Global Select Market 
with three classes of common stock namely; LGI Series A with ticker LBTYA, LGI Series 
B with ticker LBTYB and LGI Series C with ticker LBTYK.  The transaction basis is that 
each share of LGI Series A and Series B Common Stock held on the record date for the 
distribution will receive 1 share of LGI Series C Common Stock. The transaction is 
generally intended to be tax-free to holders of LGI Series A and Series B Common Stock 
for U.S. federal income tax purposes (Liberty Global, 2005). Figure 5 shows the 
evolution of the respective stocks’ close price over the 4-year trend. 
Figure 5.  LGI Close Price Evolution 
 
Source: Bloomberg Data. 
3.1.3.   Industry Review in Countries/Regions of Operation 
   Most of Liberty Global’s footprint is across Europe of which it manages its operations 
across 11 countries bound by EU Regulation which includes Communication Regulation 
and Broadcasting Law.  These cover formalities such as registration and licensing, 
distribution of media, data protection, retention and electronic commerce. Its 
European operating firms are also subject to both national and European level 
regulations on competition and on consumer protection, which are broadly 
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be briefly analyzed to have a better understanding of the markets Liberty Global Inc. 
operates in and under what regulations. 
Germany 
   Germany has altered the EU laws into national laws although under the German legal 
system competency is split between the Federal State (telecommunication law) and 
the German federal states (Bundesländer) (media law).  As of December, 2011, The 
Federal Cartel Office approved the KBW Acquisition under conditions such as 
distribution of basic digital television channels (as opposed to channels marketed in 
premium subscription packages) on its entire network in unencrypted form 
commencing January 1, 2013 (Liberty Global, 2012a). 
The Netherlands 
   The Netherlands has an electronic communications law that broadly transposes 
the Regulatory Framework. According to this electronic communications law, 
Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit ( OPTA ), the Netherlands NRA , 
should perform a market analysis to determine which, if any, operator or service 
provider has Significant Market Power . However, after several analyses, the television 
market proved to be independent of regulation as competition had increased over 
time leaving clients/consumers free to choose across providers (Liberty Global, 2012a). 
Switzerland 
   Switzerland has a regulatory system which partially reflects the principles of the EU , 
yet it is different from the European regulatory system of telecommunications. The 
Telecommunications Act (Fernmeldegesetz) regulates, in general, the transmission of 
information, including the transmission of radio and television signals. Swisscom is a 
dominant provider and as per restrictions, is the only one with unbundled access to 
the local circle of third parties. This leaves LGI’s UPC Cablecom and other cable 
providers have no such access. UPC Cablecom ’s retail customer prices are subject to 
review by the Swiss Price Regulator. In October 2012, UPC Cablecom announced an 
agreement with the Swiss Price Regulator pursuant to which UPC Cablecom would 
make certain changes to its service offerings in exchange for progressive increases in 
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the price of its basic cable connection over the next two years. In this regard, effective 
November 1, 2012, UPC Cablecom began offering a basic tier of digital television 
channels on an unencrypted basis (Liberty Global, 2012a). 
Belgium 
   Belgium has broadly transformed the Regulatory Framework into law. According to 
the electronic communications law of June 13, 2005, the BIPT  and the Belgian NRA , 
should perform  market analyses to determine which, if any, operator or service 
provider has Significant Market Power . LGI’s Telenet was pronounced as one 
regarding the market for call termination on an individual fixed public telephone 
network with the incumbent Belgacom as its competitor (Liberty Global, 2012a). 
Chile 
   LGI’s  VTR is subject to certain regulatory conditions which were imposed by the 
Chilean Antitrust Court in connection with VTR ’s combination with Metrópolis 
Intercom SA in April 2005. These conditions include, among others; 
prohibiting VTR and its control group from participating, directly or indirectly through a 
related person, in Chilean satellite or microwave television businesses, obtaining 
exclusive broadcast rights, except for specific events, and requiring VTR to offer its 
broadband capacity for resale of internet services on a wholesale basis. Internet 
services are considered complementary telecommunication services and, therefore, do 
not require concessions, permits, or licenses and wire line cable television permits are 
granted for an indefinite term and are non-exclusive(Liberty Global, 2012a). 
   Liberty Global operates in increasingly competitive markets which, if not considered 
may leave it at a loss of capacity to compete and be at par or higher thatn competitors. 
However, its products and services in markets of operation are actually highly 
competitive facing competition from DTT service providers, video provided over 
satellite platforms and networks using DSL technology in the video services sector.  
    In the provision of telephony and broadband internet services, there is increasing 
competition from the binding telecommunications operators and other service 
providers in each countries of operation as well as mobile providers of voice and data.    
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The incumbent telecommunications operators typically dominate the market for these 
services and have the advantage of nationwide networks and greater resources than 
Liberty Global to devote to the provision of these services(Liberty Global, 2012a). 
3.2.    Virgin Media Inc. (ticker VMED) 
   Virgin Media Inc., a UK- based firm established in  2006 as a merger between NTL and 
Telewest, is a ‘quadplay’ provider of broadband internet, television, mobile telephony  
and fixed line telephony services to commercial and residential customers across the 
UK. The firm’s executive headquarters are based in the US and it is listed primarily on 
NASDAQ and secondarily on the London Stock Exchange. It is the UK’s largest provider 
of residential broadband internet, pay television and fixed line telephony services by 
number of customers. The company has two segments of operation namely; Consumer 
segment and Business segment, and currently aims to use its network, people and 
creativity to go beyond traditional IT in order to help businesses transform despite 
their challenges (Virgin Media, 2012).  
   The Consumer segment distributes television programming over its cable network 
and provides broadband and fixed line telephone services to residential consumers, 
both on and off its cable network. It also includes mobile telephony and mobile 
broadband operations provided over third party mobile network. All cable broadband 
internet, television and fixed line telephone services to residential customers in the UK 
are under the Virgin Media brand and its cable services are distributed through its 
wholly-owned local access cable network covering many metropolitan areas in 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Business segment on the other 
hand, offers a collection of voice, data and internet solutions to commercial and public 
sector organizations in the UK, ranging from analogue telephony to managed data 
networks and applications. It provides services to approximately 50,000 businesses 
and almost 250 public sector organizations, while supplying communications services 
to around three quarters of the UK’s health and emergency service providers and close 
to half of the police forces (Reuters, 2013). 
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3.2.1.   Financials 
   Compared to Liberty Global, Virgin Media ended the year 2012 with a debt to capital 
ratio of 65.67%. Although this was a decrease compared to its prior year, it still falls in 
line with characteristics of Media-domiciled firms being highly leveraged. The firm as 
per covenant tries to maintain a leverage ratio of 3.75x each year and currently has 
long-term debt payable from 2016 onward.  
   Virgin Media, in the financial year ended 2012 had recorded total revenue of £4.1 
billion with a year-over-year rate of 2.7% from the preceding year as a result of 
consumer revenue growth from the demand for superfast broadband and TiVo, a 
digital video recorder. The Consumer segment each year generates slightly over 80% of 
the firm’s revenue.  Figure 6 shows Virgin Media’s revenue growth by segment over 
the 4year-trend of analysis. 
Figure 6. Virgin Media Revenue by Segment 
 
Source: Virgin Media Inc., 2010; 2012. 
   Virgin Media faced an increase of 1.5% in costs as compared to its prior 
corresponding financial year, and the years before as shown in Figure 7, as a result of  
an increase in the Business Segment cost of sales and network and other operating 
costs, which were partially offset by a decrease in consumer cost of sales due to a 
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2009, increased in terms of programming.  SG&A was highly induced by marketing and 
advertisement  which begun in the year 2011 featuring influential celebrities and the 
Virgin Brand founder, Sir Richard Branson of which thereafter, increased sales 
remarkably. Interest expense was seen to have reduced as a result of reduction in the 
level of debt and lower borrowing costs along with the effect of interest and cross 
currency interest rate swaps chosen as accounting hedges.  
 
Figure 7. Virgin Media Expenses/Revenue Comparison: 2009 and 2012 
 
Source: Virgin Media Annual Report, 2009;2012. 
   Virgin Media’s Net Income as shown in Figure 8 had remarkably increased from 
£75.9million in 2011 to £2,852.60 million in 2012, as well as compared to prior years 
which depicted losses over the 4-year trend, as a result of reduction in the deferred tax 
asset valuation as per UK tax law, which resulted in a non-cash income tax benefit of 
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Figure 8. Virgin Media’s Financial Performance 
 
Source: Virgin Media Annual Report, 2009;2012. 
   Virgin Media’s CAPEX as illustrated in Figure 9, has over the year grown mainly 
covering capital leases, fixed and intangible assets among which, a broadband upgrade 
program was implemented. The firm expects its cash CAPEX i.e. purchase of fixed and 
intangible assets, to maintain 15% to 17%  of its revenue for the current year 2013 
onward. 
Figure 9. Virgin Media’s CAPEX 
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   Virgin Media’s financials have achieved its strategies set forth in 2012 and with this, 
the firm expects sustainable growth for the years due and will still work on debt 
reduction and capital structure optimization to ensure shareholder return and a 
healthy financial status. 
3.2.2.  Stock Market Performance 
   Virgin Media’s stock as aforementioned, are listed on two markets- the London Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ with the ticker VMED. Figure 10 shows the evolution of VMEDs’ 
stock close price. 
Figure 10. VMED Stock Close Price Evolution 
 
Source: Bloomberg Data. 
3.2.3.  Industry Review in Countries/Regions of Operation 
   Virgin Media Inc. is the second largest service provider in the UK with 40% market 
share while British Sky Broadcasting Group (BSkyB) is the largest with 80% market 
share making it its current sole influential and prime competitor. British Sky is known 
for its innovative business model and callously competitive pricing due to its minor 
interest payments relative to those of Virgin Media.  
   However, pricing in the UK telecommunications market has over the years become 
more rational giving Virgin Media a guarantee on demand for data traffic that requires 


















M&A: A Case Study on Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. | Elsa Nabenge 34 
 
also promising as consolidations over the years have reduced the number of 
competitors. 
3.3.   Conclusion and justification of proposed merger 
   M&A deals in the telecommunications and media industry have grown overtime and 
proved successful, with close examples being Liberty Global and Virgin Media since 
their establishment. As per financials and industry background of region/country of 
operation, the deal that was publicly announced on the 5th of February between 
Liberty Global Inc and  Virgin Media is, with no doubt essential to both firms in many 
ways. 
    Firstly, LGI’s strategy to cover Europe, which generates 80% of its income is being 
implemented and considering the competition in the industry, the fusion of the second 
largest  multinational cable-provider firm and the second largest cable-provider firm in 
the UK promises improved market power, innovation, technology and customer base, 
among others.  
   Secondly, given the tight regulation and fairly small market size in most European 
countries where only one or two providers are available, the merged firms may 
together be able to seize a larger share on the market as a whole to improve 
competitiveness. 
   Lastly, both firms’ historical performance has had an upward orientation suggesting a 
possibility of a sustained path with no plunges. For example, cost reduction may be 
one of the benefits considering how large costs of sales, interest and SG&A 
expenditure are for both firms. Virgin Media’s capital structure optimization program if 
well implemented by Liberty Global may reduce the high leverage over time, making it 
less risky in the long-run as a whole. As the SWOT analyses (see appendix) show, the 
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4.   Performance Forecast 
   As stated in the literature review, in order to have precise valuation of the firms and 
to capture any synergy from the deal, the firms need to be assessed separately, 
realizing their potential performance. This is done by projection of the firms’ financials 
in the forthcoming years, taking into account all possible scenarios and effects. 
Historical data/trends are used obtained from the firms’ filing with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the firms’ respective websites, press statements, annual 
financial reports, co-management information, industry and analyst reports, and 
auditing by large accounting firms. 
   In order to use the valuation methods as discussed earlier, future Free Cash Flows 
(FCFs) to the firm are essential, hence the need for projection of their possible drivers 
given the characteristics and structure of each firm.  Technically, the FCFs are obtained 
from the given equation: 
                                         
 
Where;            is the firm’s after-tax operating income,       the firm’s 
capital expenditure and      is the change in non-cash working capital between 
reported financial periods (Damadoran, 2012). 
As seen from the equation, the drivers should be analyzed in full detail taking into 
account all relevant elements from the firm’s financials. The firm’s operating income 
fully depends on revenue and expenses a firm may face while CapEx and depreciation 
on investments made by the firm, and lastly, working capital depends on the short-
term financial wealth of the firm i.e. current assets and liabilities. It is worth noting 
that all rates applied during the forecast are nominal of which may only be adjusted 
appropriately during valuation. Both firms’ FCFs will be projected over a period of five 
years, given their rapid growth and transition to maturity. 
   The Telecommunications, Technology and Media (TTM) Industry has seen rapid 
technological improvements regardless of the market being in a boom or recession. 
The industry has experienced improvements such as Over-The-Top 
Content (OTT) which is the provision of video and audio services via broadband 
without a multiple system operator controlling the distribution of contents. This is 
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slowly crowding-out the traditional television and for Europe, it is expected that the 
take up OTT will be at a slower rate, only representing 10% of households until 2017 
compared to the United States’ 37.4%. This mainly due to a lower tendency to pay for 
video services as much of it is freely available in high quality by public broadcasters. 
Additionally, digital services will keep dominating analogue services therefore resulting 
in a continuous decline in analogue cable provision (Deloitte, 2013).    
4.1.    Liberty Global Inc. Performance Forecast 
   Liberty Global Inc. as mentioned earlier, is a highly acquisitive firm in the industry 
with M&A deals ranging from 2-3 a year since its establishment and its prime market 
of focus being that of Europe, which accounts for 90% of its revenue. Despite tight 
regulations, LGI has, over time claimed a large footprint across countries and regions 
of operation making it one of the largest cable service providers globally and also 
dubbed the ‘King of cable’.  Given this, the firm overall keeps expanding and improving 
its services and products amidst strong competition in countries/regions of operation. 
Historical financials show an upward trend in organic RGU additions and revenue both 
as a result of positive impact of acquisitions off-setting the negative impact of forex 
from transactions including deals and security issues across countries.  
   The firm reports its Revenue generated from its products in four segments (as shown 
in Figure 1 in the previous chapter) which are, in descending order of weight namely; 
UPC, Telenet, VTR and Corporate and other which includes less significant operating 
segments such as Puerto Rico and its corporate category. Operating expenses can also 
be spread by segments. However, SG&A, Depreciation and Amortization, and other 
expenses are reported at consolidated level. Although stock-based compensation is 
reported as an operating expense, it isn’t included in the analysis of performance of 
LGI’s reportable segments.  
   Looking forward, it is expected that organic growth continues mainly from organic 
increases in digital cable, broadband internet and telephony RGUs while a continuous 
decline in analogue cable RGUs as a result of demand for improved and upgraded 
technology and efficiency. The increase in RGU over time has been mainly due to an 
improvement in RGU mix, attributable to higher proportions of digital cable, 
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broadband internet and telephony RGU (see appendix). Assuming this mix is 
rebalanced each year, LGI’s prospects may be fulfilled. On the other hand, the Average 
Revenue Per Unit (ARPU) is expected to remain relatively unchanged which will be 
primarily driven by growth in operations in the most prominent countries under UPC 
segment; Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands. In order to maintain 
competitiveness, LGI will continue launching its newly announced product Horizon TV 
across countries of operation of which to date, is running in the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. This may mean more property and equipment additions although overall, 
it is expected that the total of these additions relative to revenue will continue to 
decline (Liberty Global, 2012a).  
Revenue Forecast 
   Liberty Global’s yoy revenue growth rate has been declining over time by roughly 6% 
from 2009 to date. This simply depicts the firm’s transition to maturity at which it 
should end up with stable growth. The revenue forecast for the firm is assumed to fall 
by 2% from 2012 year by year, until a stable year-over-year growth rate of 3% is 
attained from the year 2016 onward, resulting in a CAGR of 4% over the 5 year trend, 
assuming operations follow perpetual growth which slightly outperforms the European 
industry’s average revenue CAGR of 2.85% (PwC, 2012). The assumption follows 
expectations that organic RGU additions increase and ARPU remains unchanged 
relatively while incorporating a decline in demand for analogue cable and pay TV which 
will be offset by the new product and as before, the positive impact of acquisitions.   
   All segments are expected to grow in the same pattern, maintaining their position 
relative to total revenue. Telenet since recording insignificant growth between 2011 
and 2012 will continue grow at a rate of 2% until the year 2014 as the increase in the 
mobile business will offset the decline in analogue cable and fixed line telephony 
services. In 2015 it is likely to increase to 5% as a result of coverage and large market 
share. The yoy growth from 2016 thereafter will fall in line with that of the revenue at 
3%. The firm’s most powerful sector, UPC, with the current regulations expected to 
loosen by the end of 2013, is likely to maintain its position with the largest RGU. The 
segments will eventually converge to a 3% yoy following the pattern of consolidated 
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revenue as their share is assumed the same over the 5 year trend with prospects of 
maintained or progressive operations.  
  On the contrary, the ‘other’ segment which includes operations in Puerto Rico has 
had a downturn at the beginning of the projection as management prospects suggest it 
will contribute a smaller percentage to consolidated revenue, about half less than 
earlier (Liberty Global, 2012). The prospects on Puerto Rico follow the facts that the 
mobile operations haven’t been significantly competitive on the market historically 
however, no plans have been disclosed on discontinuing operations. The growth 
results in CAGR of 4% for UPC, Telenet and VTR over the projected period while the 
‘other’ segment has a CAGR of 27%. 
Figure 11. LGI Segment yoy and Percentage Share of Revenue 
   
Source: based on LGI Management’s Prospects and PWC Industry Outlook, 2012. 
   The launch of Horizon TV is expected to increase revenue given the progressive 
increase in price over the next two years. It is highly unlikely that ARPUs will be lost as 
a result of the price increase because of the new product mix that is available and 
according to Deloitte’s industry and sector review (2013), consumers in the current 
age on average consider cable and mobile telephony a necessity with 24% of European 
spending being towards TV subscription and licence fees. The growth of internet use is 
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   Liberty Global’s current acquisition of a 15% stake in Ziggo, the Netherlands largest 
cable operator, guarantees a surge in UPC revenue in the following years. LGI’s UPC in 
the Netherlands is already a highly recognized provider and this will therefore increase 
its current performance and market share in the country, and overall, the firm’s. 
However, it is worth noting that since UPC is second to Ziggo, higher stake in Ziggo by 
LGI may result in anti-trust issues with the Dutch government. UPC’s yoy growth like 
the other segments will converge to the revenue growth of 3%. Lastly VTR is expected 
to lose its position relative to total revenue by 1% compared to the prior year as a 
result of less demand for fixed telephony and analogue cable and the negative impact 
of a lower volume of calls subject to usage-based charges. 
Operating Expenses Forecast 
   Liberty Global’s market position in most countries of operation requires subscriber 
promotions, programming and professional fees. Its cost of sales has historically 
declined minimally with the prior year-over-year rate of 7%. The decrease in demand 
for analogue cable guarantees slight cost savings yet programming costs which form a 
large part of the CoGS are likely to increase across the main three Segments; UPC, 
Telenet and VTR. This then results in CoGS as a percentage of revenue over the next 
years, increasing by 3% from 35% to 36%, a relative ratio which is assumed constant 
over the projected years as the expected price increase to subscribers in most of LGI’s 
operations will compensate the cost increases. These price increase assumptions 
incorporate the launch of Horizon TV, growth in digital video services and mobile 
business distribution.  
   Costs are subject to inflationary pressures with respect to labor and other 
operational costs incurred during roll out of projects and foreign currency exchange 
risk with respect to costs and expenses that are denominated in currencies other than 
the respective functional currencies of operating segments (non-functional currency 
expenses). Labor costs in CoGS include temporary hire of labor for installation, 
maintenance and programming. This will result in a projected period CoGS CAGR of 3% 
compared to the 11% CAGR it had over the prior four years. 
 
M&A: A Case Study on Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. | Elsa Nabenge 40 
 
   On the other hand, SG&A are likely to be maintained as before taking up 19% of 
revenue, considering the fact that historically, the ratio has been the same. Similar to 
the firm’s CoGS, SG&A are also subject to inflationary pressures with respect to labor 
and other costs and foreign currency exchange risk. Labor costs here include the firm’s 
22,000 employees in its respective subsidiaries. 
 Capex and Depreciation Forecast 
   The Telecommunications, Technology and Media (TTM) Industry is capital intensive 
therefore large capital expenditures are expected every few years in order to maintain 
competitiveness and customer base. Liberty Global’s initiatives will result in significant 
additions to its property and equipment with expectations of a decline in expenditure 
as a percentage of revenue over time. Forecasts show the year 2013 maintaining the 
prior year’s CapEx to Revenue ratio of 20%  in order to continue the current expansion 
in its target areas of operation. Thereafter, CapEx is to decrease over the next four 
years resulting in a CapEx to Revenue ratio of 18% by 2017 and a CAGR of 2% 
compared to that of 5.8% over the assessed historic trend. 
   Depreciation and amortization as a result, are to increase in line with property and 
equipment additions therefore taking up 18% of revenue in the first two years, and 
thereafter, 17%. Taking into account some of the property expected to fully depreciate 
during the forecast period. A business-line tailored CapEx benchmark was made 
collecting sector information matching Liberty Global’s operations and thereafter, 
taking the weights and summing the corresponding ratios. This resulted in a 
benchmark ratio of 107% for LGI. While projections fall in line with the benchmark, the 
ratio increases as the years go by leaving 2017 exceeding the industry benchmark with 
a ratio of 160%. This is probably a result of most of the property being fully 
depreciated by then, leaving the capex-depreciation ratio higher. 
Operating Margin and Interest Expense Forecast 
   Liberty Global’s operating margin has, in the last two years, been at a constant rate 
of 20% after increasing from 15% in 2009 to 18% in 2010, this is simply due to similar 
operating costs relative to revenue. The forecasts however, show growth given the 
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revenue growth and a slight decrease in costs. The operating margins are then seen to 
increase in absolute terms by roughly 3% a year through 2016 and the absolute 
increase value doubling in 2017 yielding an operating margin of 36%. 
   Liberty Global’s interest expense in the previous year was high as explained earlier, 
due to debt-funding to close a deal. This left higher outstanding debt increasing the 
interest expense by 24.1% with FX effects excluded. It is expected that interest 
expenses reduce over time with forecasts showing reduction from 2012’s 16% of 
revenue, to 14% at the end of the forecast period. Historically, as stated by the firm, 
the weighted average of cost of debt has reduced (Liberty Global, 2012); yet expenses 
highly depend on outstanding debt and new borrowings with higher interest rates. 
Liberty Global’s borrowings are made at subsidiary level with different ratings and 
therefore, to obtain a consolidated cost of debt financing, a weighted average has to 
be taken. The weighted average cost of debt used for valuation will be 6% (or 5.99% to 
be precise) (Liberty Global, 2012a). 
Net Income and tax expenses 
   Historically, Liberty Global’s net income has been negative or close to the industry 
median of about $300 yet far from the average of $2,100, most of which has been a 
result of gains from discontinued operations. The forecast assumes no operations are 
to be discontinued over the period of projection therefore all earnings will be 
generated solely after tax. The table below shows the net income projections: 
Table 1. Liberty Global Historical Net Income and Projections (2013-2017) 
Historical (in millions) Forecast (in millions) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 CAGR Industry Av. 
-$412.1 $388.2 -$772.7 $322.8 $8.4 $357 $698 $1048 $1,725  280% $2,182 
Source: Liberty Global, 2009-2012; Projections based on available data, 2013-2017. 
   Earnings before tax in the projected years are all seen high enough to pay taxes of a 
blended tax rate of 26.67% applied to its consolidated income as given in the firm’s 
Unaudited Prospective Financial Information (Liberty Global, 2012b). Liberty Global’s 
income tax expenses are liable to the US as it is a US corporation. Its worldwide 
effective tax rate is reduced under a provision in US tax law that defers the imposition 
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of US tax on certain foreign active income until that income is repatriated to the 
United States. However, the tax benefits and expenses, will also use the 
abovementioned rate in order to incorporate any benefits from operations in other 
countries, assuming the given tax rate is the firm’s estimated worldwide effective tax 
rate. 
Net Working Capital (NWC) 
   To obtain the forecasted NWC, the first assumption was that of no deferred taxes as 
earnings before tax are considerably high enough to afford the expenses. Accounts 
receivable were projected on the basis as percentage of revenue while other assets 
where projected based on their historical trend. Accounts payable were forecasted on 
the basis as percentage of CoGS while accrued expenses as percentage of revenue. The 
current position of long-term debt and capital lease were already given in by the firm’s 
report until 2017 thereafter. Other current liabilities were set to zero as the trend was 
downward while the unearned revenue was given a downward growth rate 
approaching zero, as percentage of revenue. This given, the networking capital was 
obtained as the difference between current assets and current liabilities, less cash. 
4.1.1. Financial Leverage and cost of capital 
   Liberty Global’s debt-to-capital ratio as mentioned earlier was extremely high and 
the highest compared to past years. The aim to decrease the ratio to 60% is 
incorporated in the valuation given the firm’s operating cash flows. Liberty Global’s 
accretive acquisition strategies, ability to generate cash and its interest coverage of 
2.99 however earn it the power to borrow to finance its expansion initiatives. The cost 
of debt as mentioned earlier is 5.99% and Liberty Global’s S&P 500 credit rating is 
B+(Positive), giving it a probability of default of 5.5%.  
   Using CAPM to estimate the cost of capital, the risk-free rate used is an average of 
historical yield from 2007 on the yield of the US 10-year T Bond of 2.83%. The risk-free 
rate is estimated in such a manner given the newly adopted volatility of securities 
making bonds and T-Bills not 100% risk-free as most prior literature suggested; 
therefore using a historical average counting ten years back from the end of the 
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projected period, 2017.  The equity risk premium used, as concluded in the literature 
review is obtained using historical data of over a century from Credit Suisse and is 
currently at 5.30%. Table 2 shows the parameters used in the standalone valuation of 
LGI. 
Table 2. Estimation of LGI’s Valuation Parameters 
Parameters Using Peers for Industry Beta 
Estimation 
Using Damodaran’s Industry Beta 
βu 0.45 0.96 
ΒL 1.13 1.76 
rf 2.83% 2.83% 
(rm-rf) 5.30% 5.30% 
kA 5% 8% 
kE 8.8% 12.2% 
KD 6% 6% 
WACCLGI 6.2% 7.5% 
Effective tax rate 26.67% 26.67% 
Debt target ratio  60% 60% 
Source: Valuation based on Projections using Firm’s data Liberty, 2012b; Goldman Sachs, 2013. 
   The unlevered beta when obtained using the top five comparable and tailored firms, 
done by obtaining the equity betas from Reuters, converting them to unlevered betas 
using their respective financial risks i.e. debt-to-equity ratio as shown in the Literature 
Review, and finally obtaining the median as suggested by Koeller et al (2010) and re-
levering it using the target debt-to-equity ratio unfortunately results in an unlevered 
beta of 0.45, a little too low and unreliable, despite peer firms in the industry being 
highly leveraged. To avoid any further complexity, an industry beta of 0.96 was used 
for estimation of cost of capital, obtained from Damodaran’s database (2012).  
    Liberty Global’s beta even with a rebalanced capital structure is higher than 1 yet 
better than the earlier ratio which would give an incredible beta of 9.25. Using the 
unlevered beta yields a cost of assets (or unlevered equity) of 8% and a levered cost of 
equity of 12.2%, while the WACC is 7.5%. However, since the relative debt levels are 
uncertain, the method of valuation to be used will be the APV method. 
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4.1.2.   Valuation Results 
   Using the APV method as per Literature review, the forecasted base-case cash flows 
are discounted using the cost of assets and an assumed perpetuity growth of cash 
flows in line with the revenue at 3% in order to have a terminal value, yielding the 
unlevered value of LGI of $69.8 billion implying a share price of $124.2 as of Monday 
29th of April, 2013. Given the different price ranges and actual proportion of shares 
outstanding of the three stock classes, the abovementioned implied share price simply 
assumes all share classes are priced the same. It is worth noting however that by the 
end of the projection period, it is likely that shares LBTYA and LBTYB actually achieve a 
target price between $110-120 while LBTYK around $110 provided that the firm 
maintains its operations with expansions where necessary and continues its 
repurchase program. 
   The second part of APV valuation involves interest tax shields which are calculated 
using the effective tax rate, cost of debt and LGI’s long-term debt (as it has no short-
term debt) projected by dividing the projected interest expenses by the weighted cost 
of debt, net of “current portion of long-term debt”. The interest tax shields are too, 
assumed to grow in perpetuity after 2017 at 3%, slightly above the industry’s CAGR, so 
that the company is assumed to be in a steady state thereafter. This yields the present 
value of interest tax shields of $12.46 billion. However to be more precise, as 
suggested by Damadoran (2012) the interest tax shield should be adjusted by the 
firm’s corresponding probability of default. Given this, the present value of tax shields 
is multiplied by (1-0.055) giving the adjusted present value of tax shields of $11.77 
billion.  
   Lastly, all financing effects should be incorporated. This means that since Liberty 
Global is a highly leveraged firm, costs of financial distress are of relevance in valuation 
especially considering its high probability of default (        ). The cost of distress is 
calculated using the average industry cost of distress (or sector cost) once again 
tailored to its business line yielding about 108% of its unlevered value. This falls in line 
with the fact that assuming the firm faced bankruptcy, most of its assets would be 
highly illiquid as well as subscriber credibility on which firms of this kind solely depend. 
Collectively, the cost of financial distress is derived from: 
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   Collectively, the value of Liberty Global is $80.77 billion, which shows the firm’s 
potential to almost double its Enterprise Value in 5years’ time given that its Enterprise 
Value as at year end of 2012 was about $44 billion. 
Although the WACC valuation isn’t considered in this work, the value obtained using 
the firm’s target ratios is $76.4 billion, a value which can be explained by the fact that 
Liberty Global’s debt levels are uncertain considering its acquisitive nature as well as 
the heterogeneous levels of indebtedness across its subsidiaries. Additionally, 
repurchasing of shares may not necessarily reduce the ratio to that of its target 
therefore, once again proving that for a firm of such nature, the APV method may be a 
more precise method. 
4.1.3.    Sensitivity Analysis 
   The values given are a rough estimate and the firm given its drivers may either yield 
values lower or higher than that of the base case shown in the standalone valuation 
results, taking note that only the APV method is considered. The TMT industry in 
Europe is slowly gaining competition internally across European peers with Liberty 
Global’s main competitors being Eutelsat, Kabel Deutschland, SES and Telekom. The 
firm’s mobile telephony is still growing and provided the competition at hand, Liberty 
Global’s innovation in this sub-sector may determine the rate at which the firm may 
eventually grow.  
   On the other hand, given the firm’s many subsidiaries, it faces the risk of fluctuations 
in foreign currency in markets of operation, strict regulation policies which in some 
countries of operation constrain it from having a larger market share and lastly, 
adverse tax consequences. Although most of these risk factors are beyond this 
valuation, they are, in a way incorporated in the terminal growth assumption.  For 
example, having higher exposure to these risk factors may result in a plunge in the 
firm’s operations therefore overall having a lower consolidated growth rate. The 
assumption follows different terminal growth rates, the impact it may have on the 
Enterprise Value, value of equity, as well as the implied price assuming the number of 
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shares outstanding are as at 29th of April, 2013. Table 3 below shows the sensitivity of 
the values given the different growth rates. 
Table 3. Sensitivity to Terminal Growth-LGI 
Terminal Growth Rate Implied Share Price  All Equity Value Value of the Firm 
1% $93.05 $52,267.50 $59,371.06 
2% $105.99 $59,537.22 $68,095.47 
 3%* $124.20 $69,763.33 $80,770.26 
4% $151.69 $85,209.49 $101,181.73 
5% $198.04 $111,242.46 $142,437.74 
*Base Case 
   As seen above, provided the firm’s operations are highly exposed to any of the 
abovementioned factors, the firm may result in lower growth rates i.e. below 3% 
therefore yielding lower values. On the other hand, if the firm’s improves its 
operations in order to complement or outperform the risks at hand, higher values may 
be achieved with a greater potential for shareholders’ benefits being immensely 
maximized.  
   Provided the acquisitive nature of the firm, debt levels are vital in the valuation as 
the firm’s nature makes it highly leveraged. This given and considering the mode of 
valuation, interest tax shields if given interest rates will be higher therefore leaving the 
firm with a higher value when the debt financing effects are added to the all-equity 
value as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Sensitivity to Interest Rates-LGI 
Cost of Debt Interest Tax Shields Enterprise Value 
5% $15,416.11 $83,564.16 
5.5% $13,625.62 $8,1872.14 
6%* $12,459.61 $80,770.26 
6.5% $11,599.43 $79,957.39 
7% $10,974.67 $79,367.00 
*Base Case 
4.2.  Virgin Media Inc. Performance Forecast 
   Virgin Media’s up-to-date services earn it the title of second-largest service provider 
in the UK. Its hi-tech broadband internet, cable and telephony products with 
continuous improvement yield an upward trend in RGU organic additions, generating 
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high revenue year by year. The firm’s reportable segments- Consumer and Business 
have overtime, grown yoy with an increase in demand from the business segment. 
Virgin Media’s primary asset is its cable network which is shared by its segments. The 
firm’s assets are reviewed on a consolidated basis therefore the cost of operating its 
network, depreciation, amortization, and goodwill and intangible asset impairments 
are not reported by segment. 
   Financials over the 4-year trend depict sustainable growth with a stable decline in 
costs year-over-year. The firm however expects increase in costs given the merger at 
hand, as a result of change in capital structure, which may lead to additional charges, 
an increase in administrative costs, losses on extinguishment of debt, gains and losses 
on derivative instruments, interest expense and stock-based compensation expense 
This will not be considered in the stand-alone valuation (Virgin Media, 2012a).  
   Virgin Media’s business strategy and strong corporate culture have earned it 
sustainable growth over the past four years. Strategies such as revenue growth 
through customer additions, product cross sell, tier mix and selective price increases 
have led to Consumer segment revenues increasing by 2% yoy.  Although inbound 
mobile revenue actually declined due to the step down in regulated mobile 
termination rates, it was offset by the positive impact of an improving customer mix. 
   The firm’s TiVo service rollout and broadband speed upgrade have accounted for the 
firm’s property and equipment additions through investment in network infrastructure 
resulting in overall capital expenditure relative to revenue in an upward pattern over 
the 4-year trend.  
Revenue Forecast 
   Virgin Media’s strategy of revenue growth through customer additions, product cross 
sell, tier mix and selective price increases has over time led to rising Consumer 
segment revenue. On the other hand, demand for superfast broadband and TiVo 
remain the highest revenue drivers and are expected to maintain their ARPU. Historical 
data shows that consumers migrate to upgrades within Virgin Media’s services. The 
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Business segment has in the prior year, depicted rapid growth and these developments 
stir expectations of sustained growth in the future. 
Figure 12. VMED Sector yoy and Percentage Share of Revenue 
 
Source: based on VMED Management’s Prospect, PwC and Goldman Sachs Industry Outlook , 2012. 
    The forecasts show revenue growth at a sustained rate of 3% with CAGR of 2.2%, 
over the projected five years. The UK sector CAGR is however, at 3.10% making Virgin 
Media’s growth a little below the expected rate. The assumed steady growth follows 
the prior three years which have maintained a year-over-year rate of 3% despite the 
economic downturn.  
Operating expenses Forecast 
   Virgin Media’s CoGS historically ranged between 1.5% to 3% yoy making the forecast 
based on the assumption that the CoGS as a percentage of revenue will be stable at 
35%, dropping from 40% of the prior year with a CAGR of 2.2%. As expected in the 
industry, technology upgrade has overtime continued to drive out older versions with 
fixed line telephony being one of them. With this at hand, this implies cost savings to 
some level yet upgrade of current product mix and increase in television customers’  
demand for TiVo call for an increase in costs.  
   The SG&A costs are expected to maintain their historical position as a percentage of 
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had high advertising costs, it is expected that these costs are lower from the year 2013 
onwards until another product launch. 
Capex and Depreciation Forecast 
   As with LGI, Virgin Media faces capital intensity and aims to minimize it as much as 
possible. The roll out of the TiVo Pay-TV will keep CapEx in 2013 at 17% of revenue and 
will decline over time ending up with 15% of revenue in years 2016 and 2017. 
   Depreciation on the other hand will increase in line with CapEx as net property and 
equipment additions decline yoy by -2%.  Virgin Media’s CapEx-to-depreciation ratio is 
below the industry ratio, ranging between 66%-90% throughout the projection period. 
Operating Margin and Interest Expense Forecast 
  Virgin Media’s operating margin has increased at a low rate in prior years probably as 
a result of higher operating costs. However, the decline in costs shows an absolute yoy 
increase of 2% resulting in a margin of 29% in the year 2017. 
Interest expenses are likely to decline as the firm has focused on reducing the 
expenses as well as optimizing its capital structure. This said, interest expenses have 
been projected to grow (decline) by a yoy of -1% with a CARG of -0.4%, resulting in a 
decline as percentage of revenue from 2012’s 10%, to 8% at the end of the period of 
projection. Interest expenses are made with a weighted average cost of debt of 6.83%. 
Net Income and tax expenses 
   The projection of cash flows leading to net income assumes no discontinuation of 
operations. Virgin Media’s net income has been positive since 2011 with 2012 being 
the highest as a result of deferred taxes. The carry-over leaves 2013 with net income 
above the industry’s average, while the following years have normal net income 
without any additions and lie below the industry average. The CAGR is probably 
negative as a result of Virgin Media’s deferred taxes. 
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Table 5. Virgin Media’s Projected Net Income 
Historical (in millions) Forecast (in millions) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 CAGR Industry 
-£357.8 -£141.4 £75.9 £2,853 £2,331 £485.2 £663 £825 £990.6 -19.3% £1,409 
Source: Virgin Media, 2009-2012; Projections based on available data, 2013-2017. 
   The tax expenses on the other hand are assumed to return to normal as a result of 
increase in revenue and decrease in operating and interest expenses. The cash flows 
are taxed at 23% which is the expected revised tax rate in the UK for 2013, 21% for 
2014 and 20% 2015 onward. It is expected that taxes are to decrease from 23% to 20% 
given the respective years (Virgin Media, 2012).  
4.2.1.  Financial leverage and cost of capital 
   Virgin Media’s debt-capital-ratio has been slightly higher than the industry average 
and the target ratio is therefore 40%. The firm has Standard & Poor’s credit rating of 
BB (Positive) with the probability of default being 4%.   To compute the costs of capital, 
Credit Suisse’s historical equity risk premium for the UK is 4.30% and a risk-free asset 
of an average yield of 1.85% since 2007 of the 10-year UK Government bond is used. 
The same method comparables are used to compute the unlevered beta, which is 0.45 
and re-levering it gives a levered beta of 0.9. Once again, Damodaran’s industry beta of 
0.96 is used. Using the betas, the unlevered cost of equity (or cost of assets) is 6% and 
the levered is 7%, while the WACC is 6.4%. 
4.2.2.   Valuation Results 
   As in the Literature Review, there is a currency mismatch and therefore to 
understand better, cash flows of both stand-alone valuations should be in the same 
currency. A forecast of exchange rates over the projection period needs to be made. 
To do so, the following method will be used from the literature review. 
            [
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Where;           is the expected exchange rate in the next period(s),     the spot rate, 
  the number of years forward and 
         
            
 is the factor that determines the annual 
change in the exchange rate. 
The spot rate of the dollar/pound ($/£) as at 29th April, 2013 is 1.5483. The differential 
factor 
         
            
  is that between long term riskless interest rates of which in this case, 
are the risk-free rates. The pound sterling dominated cash flows will be changed to 
dollars therefore the predicted rates are as follows: 
Table 6. Exchange Rate Forecast 
 
  The predicted rates prove the prospects of the pound growing stronger in the next 
five years by PwC (PwC, 2013).   The FCFs are then obtained in US$ and therefore, the 
cost of capital to be used will be the US $ dominated cost of assets when using the APV 
method. This gives an all-equity present value of $32.4 billion. 
   The interest tax shields are first obtained in the pound-sterling currency and are 
thereafter converted into dollars after the terminal value is obtained. As before, the 
present value of tax shields should be adjusted and collecting all three, yields the final 
value of Virgin Media Inc. in US dollars of $34.9 billion, implying a price of $77.4, once 
again a value that is likely to be realized if operations and management’s strategies 
and innovation are maintained or improved. This given VMED’s share price which was 
topped approximately $50 in the first quarter of 2013. 
   The WACC valuation gave an Enterprise Value of $45 billion, a value that was 
obtained in pound-sterling cash flows and rates thereafter converted to USD. The large 
difference follows the firm’s low WACC and once again, it could be that the firm may 
not achieve the target ratio as expected while another major difference lies in 
decreasing interest tax shields as a result of taxes lowering from 2013 onwards 
$/£ Exchange rate Forecast Differential factor Spot rate 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 1.01 1.5483 
1.56 1.58 1.59 1.61 1.62     
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whereas the WACC valuation only incorporates the 2013 tax rate. This then proves 
how easily the WACC valuation may be misleading if certain details are not 
incorporated. 
4.2.3.     Sensitivity Analysis 
   Virgin Media like Liberty Global operates in a highly competitive market with main 
competitors being British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC., BT Group PLC. and TalkTalk 
Telecom Group PLC. The intense competition which involves unpredictable rapid 
changes in technology may have adverse effects on the firm’s revenue while increasing 
costs and reducing the firm’s ARPU. On the other hand, the fixed line telephony 
provided the vast demand for mobile telephony may have no chances of improvement 
considering the fact that historically in the industry overall, this product has had 
negative growth. Other risk factors include foreign exchange risk as the firm pays part 
of its interest and principal obligations dominated in US dollars and Euros. The 
aforementioned factors may have an impact on the firm’s overall growth just as its 
counterpart Liberty Global. Therefore, sensitivity to changes in the terminal growth 
and its impact on share price is assessed as shown below. 
Table 7. Sensitivity to Terminal Growth- VMED 
Terminal Growth Rate Implied Share Price All Equity Value Value of the Firm 
1% $59.38 $24,881.10 $27,401.92 
2% $66.86 $28,017.15 $30,512.89 
3%* $77.39 $32,428.54 $34,888.99 
4% $93.29 $39,091.79 $41,498.93 
5% $120.09 $50,322.04 $52,639.33 
*Base Case 
   Provided that Virgin Media maintains or improves its current operations, growth 
prospects may be higher than that of the standalone valuation yielding higher net 
worth for existing shareholders. However, if the firm slacks in the current competitive 
environment or has no ways to shield against risk factors such as those of currency, 
then the firm will have a downward growth therefore leaving shareholders with less. 
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4.3.   Decision Based on Standalone Valuations 
   It is clear from both valuations that the firms are likely to add value to shareholders’ 
wealth therefore both can be recommended as ‘Buy’ or ‘Hold’ depending on the 
behavior of the firms’ main drivers provided the risk factors that they are exposed to. 
However, the sensitivity analyses suggest that as long as terminal growth is positive for 
both firms, there’s a probability of maximization of shareholders’ net worth, thus 
suggesting ‘Buy’. 
   Of the two firms, Liberty Global is more likely to have an unstable leverage level 
therefore this may affect the firm’s value. As the effects of changes in leverage are 
only seen in the present value of interest tax shields in APV valuation, it may suggest 
that the more interest the firm has, the higher the value. However, factors such as the 
likeliness of financial distress may increase as well as lower flexibility, therefore 
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5. Valuation of the Merged Firm 
   Using the standalone values of the firm, an idea is given of what the merged firm 
would currently be worth given the 5-year forecast, without synergy. As concluded in 
the standalone valuation, the values obtained from the APV valuation are used for the 
rest of the assessment. Since both firms have similar operations and report their 
revenues at consolidated level and not by product, computation may be done without 
any complex approaches and assumptions. As per literature, to obtain the value of 
synergy, the merged firm value is estimated and thereafter, a value incorporating 
potential synergy is computed. The value of synergy is then the difference between 
the two (Damodaran, 2005).   
   Liberty Global’s second-time negotiation with Virgin Media ascertains that prior to 
the firm’s assessment, Virgin Media proves to be of more value in the long run than it 
actually is currently. Considering Liberty Global’s current footprint, adding Virgin 
Media to its existing operations would be beneficial considering the rationale of the 
merger. 
5.1.    Valuation without Synergy 
   The merged firm is value obtained from the sum of the standalone firm values 
(Damodaran, 2005). Summing the financials in this case yields a combined value of 
$115.7 billion (see appendix for a summary of the sum of financials). An alternative 
way can be obtained using the sum of FCFs of the two firms dominated in the 
acquirer’s currency discounted using the option of applying the acquiring firm’s cost of 
assets. Likewise, the present value of interest tax shields are summed and are 
discounted using a weighted average cost of debt. The weighted average cost of debt 
is computed by applying the debt weights of the merged firm to the respective costs of 
debt. 
   The re-computation of the firm’s value involving the discounting of the summed FCFs 
is a way to check the feasibility of the value obtained by simply summing the 
standalone values. The cost of assets used for the merged firm is equivalent to that of 
Liberty Global as the standalone APV valuations of both firms were dominated in 
Liberty Global’s home currency (US dollar) taking into account inflationary measures at 
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conversion of the pound sterling to dollars, using the forecasted exchange rates. 
However, the cost of debt as it follows different conditions for each firm is a sensitive 
factor and as mentioned above, should be the weighted average of the standalone 
rates. Table 8 shows the variables used in the valuation of the merger. 




Debt weight LGI 0.84 




   This re-computation yields a value of $115.8 billion with the slight difference mainly 
attributed to the default rate applied to the adjusted present value of interest tax 
shields. It is not possible to give an estimate of the implied target price as currently, 
part of the deal will be made using shares. It is worth noting that all values are 
dominated in the acquirer’s currency (US dollar) throughout this section. 
5.2.    Valuation with synergy 
   For every deal made, there is an expected positive impact on the value of the 
combined firms which should be realized. This as mentioned in the literature review is 
known as synergy which, to acquirers is worth the handsome premiums they get to 
pay. Damodaran (2005) defines synergy as the ‘additional value that is generated by 
combining two firms, creating opportunities that wouldn’t have been available to 
these firms operating independently’.  
   Synergies are further classified into two: operational and financial. Operational 
synergy is usually in the form of economies of scale captured from the merger, 
therefore resulting in cost efficiency and higher profits. Other forms as per literature 
are those of market share domination and functional strengths. Financial synergies on 
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the other hand involve reduced costs of capital, tax benefits, excess cash and debt 
capacity. 
   Valuation of synergy like valuation of a merger involves assumptions of future cash 
flows, incorporating the most favorable conditions given the respective drivers. 
Therefore, in order to proceed with the valuation, the firms at hand ought to be 
studied focusing on drivers of potential synergies. 
5.2.1.    Potential Synergies 
   The merged firm is likely to be the world’s leading broadband communications 
provider, considering its customer base. This scale advantage shown in Figure 13 is 
likely to motivate higher innovation and operating leverage. Also, given the main 
countries of operation in market share order; UK, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and 
Netherlands, their stable economic and regulatory climate guarantee a healthy growth 
profile. As the merged firm will have its operations in the five strongest markets in 
Europe among others, the revenue generated by these will account for almost 80% of 
consolidated revenue. 
   The firms, given their similar operations when merged are likely to maintain their 
lead in digital TV experience with Horizon and TiVo, high speed broadband delivery and 
compelling bundles. Additionally, Liberty Global and Virgin Media’s complementary 
core strengths promise a well aligned triple play product suite, product roadmap and 
expertise. Virgin Media’s expertise in mobile and B2B (business-to-business) products 
is likely to improve Liberty Global’s businesses in European countries where mobile 
revenues are generated, with the potential of a Pan-European B2B. All in all, the 
growth opportunities induced by this merger are expected to impact the merged firm’s 
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Figure 13.  Cable operators by customer base (in millions, as at 31st Dec, 2012) 
 
Source: Liberty Global, 2013. 
   The industry of operation as mentioned earlier is capital intensive therefore, CapEx is 
high and in order to maintain or improve competitiveness, costs are incurred on a 
large scale. This means that merging will to some extent yield cost savings in network, 
IT support and procurement, among other costs of sales. 
   The on-going deal creates a new holding parent firm, Liberty Global Corporation 
Limited, re-registered as a UK plc. which will therefore be renamed Liberty Global plc., 
prior to the completion of the merger. Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. will be 
subsidiaries of the parent company and Virgin Media will retain its brand name. This 
given, the difference in marginal taxes between the US and the UK will result in gains 
to the merged firm given that UK taxes are to be 23%, 21% and eventually 20% while 
the US marginal tax is 35% and its blended tax rate across subsidiaries is 26.67%. This 
in itself hence yields slightly higher FCFs, although offset by lower debt tax shields, 
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5.2.2.  Operational Synergy 
             Revenue Synergy 
   This is highly indeterminate especially for companies in transition to maturity as it is 
usually impossible to manipulate revenue generation at no cost. Revenue synergies 
depend on strategies that can be executed to enhance sales such as new product 
launches although one has to take into account that such strategies highly depend on 
consumers’ and competitors’ reaction especially in the Cable and Telecom industry. 
The time frame is also important regarding synergies and it is clear that execution of 
such strategies requires time and costs in order for it to match the supposed market. 
However, given the customer base as per Figure 13, the larger scale if maintained or 
increased may drive higher revenue generation. Virgin Media’s history of annual price 
increases as well as that of the UPC division of Liberty Global keeping the current 
customer base constant, assures a level of increase in revenue. Also, currently there 
has been price inflation especially in the Telecom industry in the UK.  As mentioned 
earlier, since access to cable is considered a necessity for most households and 
businesses in this age, it is unlikely that many current subscribers will be lost given the 
quality of the existing and new product mixes.  
        Cost Synergy 
   Of all synergies, the most common and likely in most deals, especially of firms with 
similar operations is that of cost.  Cost synergies result from cost savings which 
increase firm value through increased operating income. Damodaran (2005) gives two 
possibilities of cost savings; one-time and continuous. The one-time increases cash 
flow and the present value in a specific period of occurrence while the continuous is 
across all periods, having a larger impact on firm value, margins and income. In the 
case of the merged firm (which from now will be referred to as Liberty Global plc.), the 
gain of specialists in mobile technology and network distribution from Virgin Media, 
saves the firm as a whole, expenditure on hiring externals to train or work on any 
projects related to improvement of this product. Unfortunately, CoGS and SG&A are 
not further broken down in both firm’s statements and it is therefore difficult to have a 
specific portions analyzed. However, a rough estimate of costs incurred on average by 
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peers from the European industry outlook (Goldman Sachs, 2013) will be applied to 
the merged firm.  
   The merger may allow for costs to be spread as merging with Virgin Media would 
greatly benefit the mobile operations of Liberty Global Inc. as Virgin Media has a 
credible Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) which may link the two mobile 
services providers making it easier to provide services such as 3G and 4G in most of 
Liberty Global’s strictly regulated markets, relieving it of the licensing costs it would 
have to incur.  Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) which allows unbundled access across 
clients and customers from mobile to the cable network may save the merged firm 
costs of the fees incurred to provide such services as well as reduce single-play churn. 
Virgin Media’s quad-play bundling if applied to other subsidiaries will lower the 
customer churn rates that are currently borne by LGI. The Merged firm’s CoGS without 
synergy result in a CAGR of 2.4%, suggesting a 2% decrease for the acquiring firm 
which has a standalone CAGR of 3% over the projected years. The merged firm’s CoGS 
without synergy has an average CoGS/Revenue ratio of 36% from 2013 through 2017. 
   Provided the potential cost savings, Liberty Global plc. will follow a 2% decrease in 
the CoGS/Revenue decrease of 2% therefore resulting in an average ratio of 35% 
across the forecasted period, making the merged firm’s CoGS with synergy have a 
slightly lower CAGR of 2.06%. This then allows for higher operating income, therefore 
yielding higher FCFs and increasing firm value when discounted at its respective rate, 
while keeping the revenue and all other operating expenses constant.  
   SG&A expenses overall  as a percentage of revenue are assumed to remain constant, 
as for both firms, operations will continue to run as before with reduction in marketing 
for Virgin Media and a slight increase in that of Liberty Global for the Horizon product, 
therefore offsetting each other.  Another reason as to why consolidated SG&A are to 
remain without a significant change is due to the fact that the merged firm has 
subsidiaries outside the UK which may also offset the benefit of lower G&A costs in the 
UK. Employee costs in both firms pre-merger incorporated inflationary pressure as per 
forecast of inflation in Europe over the next years, as mentioned in the industry 
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review. These costs may be said to be offset by the on-going and foreseen price 
increases in products in some subsidiaries.  
   No announcements were made on any layoffs by both firms post-merger therefore, 
employee costs under SG&A are assumed to be constant too. The merged firm plans to 
run both subsidiaries (Liberty Global and Virgin Media) as before with no significant 
changes in personnel costs, outsourced labor and professional fees. The expenses are 
spread resulting in SG&A being 19% across the period of projection, as a percentage of 
Liberty Global plc.’s revenue. This then differs from the stand-alone ratios which were 
20% of revenue for Virgin Media and 19% for Liberty Global. 
         Capital Expenditure Synergy 
   Provided the industry of operation the merger is likely to reduce the rate of the 
overall firm’s property additions. Firstly, considering the current state of Virgin Media’s 
property and equipment, the firm will not need further significant additions as it 
invested vastly over the past three years making it retain losses ever since. Therefore, 
capital expenditure savings will be realized. With Virgin Media’s up-to-date 
technological innovations and disciplined approach to CapEx, it is likely that this will be 
of high benefit to Liberty Global plc., therefore maintaining and possibly improving 
market share in regions of operation. The merged firm’s initial CapEx ranges as follows 
in Figure 14. 






2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
CAGR -2.31% 
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   The trend follows an unstable pattern and therefore shows that the spread is uneven 
and actually converges to the CapEx/Revenue ratio range set by Virgin Media which 
was between 16% and 17%. In order to improve this and to be consistent with all other 
assumptions, it will be assumed that yearly, CapEx will reduce converging to the 
minimum of Virgin Media’s target CapEx/Revenue ratio, which is 16% as shown in 
Figure 15.  This results in CapEx decreasing on average by 4% with a CAGR of -2.9% and 
will in turn induce a reduction in depreciation and amortization while increasing 
operating income, all other drivers constant. 
Figure 15. CaPEx /Revenue (Combined firm Synergy) 
 
5.2.3. Financial synergy 
             Tax benefits 
   As mentioned earlier, the relocation to the UK will in itself provide lower tax costs 
therefore earnings attributable to shareholders will be higher. Virgin Media’s 
accumulated losses due to massive investments in network infrastructure earned it a 
pre-tax profit of £261 million in 2012 as a result of being exempt from tax. A further 
explanation for the tax exemption is that accumulated profits should exceed £261 
million in order for it to remit corporate taxes. Given the forecast in this assessment, it 
is likely that the exemption period may be shorter than proclaimed by most analysts. 
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work in favor of its shareholders’ earnings in addition to the lower tax rate incurred 
under the UK tax regulations. 
Cost of Capital 
   Liberty Global plc.’s cost of debt of 6.13% is estimated to be slightly higher than that 
of LGI and lower than that of Virgin Media. The firm however, is expected to eventually 
achieve a debt-to-capital ratio of 57% when the target ratios are merged using a 
weighted average approach. This therefore means that in the first few years, Liberty 
Global plc. will still be highly indebted therefore generating high interest tax shields.  
Table 9. Computation of cost of capital 




Liberty Global Plc. 
Debt weights 0.84 0.16 1.00 
Debt-Capital ratio 93% 54% 86% 
Debt-Capital target ratio  60% 40% 57% 
βl 1.56 1.26 1.75 
ke 11% 7% 9% 
Kd 5.99% 6.83% 6.13% 
WACC with target ratios 6.78% 6.53% 6.74% 
 
   The cost of capital computed is 6.74%, higher than Virgin Media’s. Nevertheless, the 
WACC isn’t used for the valuation of the firm as the APV is a better approach 
considering the inconsistency of the capital structure of the firms at hand- mostly, 
Liberty Global Inc. Both firms aim at similar investment opportunities with Liberty 
Global being more acquisitive and Virgin Media more extensive. This then shows no 
chance of significant synergy concerning excess cash as both firms are relatively large 
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5.3.  Integration and Restructuring Costs 
   When pricing an acquisition, the valuation must also incorporate cash outflows 
accompanying the deal as they affect the realization of potential synergies. Deloitte 
(2013) advises that ‘a smooth integration depends on identifying, prioritizing and 
measuring synergies early in the process.’  Synergy valuation should be assessed with 
caution as it too incurs costs as the post-merger integration process of the acquired 
company is what creates value. These costs may include plant decommission costs, 
severance to be paid to employees, rebranding campaigns, integration costs for 
different IT systems and retraining of employees (Goedhart, Koller and Wessels, 2010).  
5.3.1.   Liberty Global Inc.’s past acquisitions 
   In 2010 Liberty Global’s restructuring and integration costs of roughly $126 million 
included the acquisition of Germany’s second largest cable operator UnityMedia, 
contractual obligations of satellite capacity of Chellomedia (Liberty Global’s distributor 
of channels and video services), dish-turning and duplicate satellite costs in connection 
with the migration of operations in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia to a new 
satellite post-acquisition and employee severance and termination costs related to 
reorganization and integration activities, primarily in Europe. The acquisition’s 
consideration totaled approximately $4.5 billion and the costs represented 2.8% of it. 
KBW and Aster were acquired in 2011 with considerations of $4.4 billion and $785 
million respectively with restructuring and integration costs accounting for roughly 
1.8% and 1.63% respectively. Reorganization and integration activities were primarily 
in Europe and Chile. In 2012, costs were incurred related to the acquisition of increase 
in the market share in Germany of KBW of with employee severance and termination 
costs related to reorganization and integration activities of roughly 2% of the 
consideration. 
   Liberty Global plc. will incur significant, nonrecurring costs associated with 
accomplishing the merger.  The expected costs are nonrecurring advisory, legal and 
other transaction costs that will be directly associated with the merger which sum up 
to about $391 million, representing close to 2% of the consideration of $24 billion. It is 
expected that synergies will offset these costs over time. Additional costs may be 
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incurred to maintain employee morale and retain key employees (Liberty Global, 
2013).  
   In conclusion, it is seen that the prominent and substantial synergies from the 
merger are from cost, CapEx and tax savings. Cost savings are likely to result from a 
once-off investment which may include IT upgrade and loops that will realize these 
synergies. This said, it is likely that the first financial year may experience dis-synergies 
while incurring these costs. Upon introduction of ULL, high speed broadband and 
MVNO in the UK, Virgin Media reported a guided and aggregate expenditure net Capex 
of £760 million (approx. $1,178 million), which will also be assumed as the integration 
costs to be possibly incurred by LGI. Because it’s uncertain of when exactly these 
synergies will be realized, it’s possible that it may be gradual, year by year as the 
underlying assumptions all depend on convergence to an optimal ratio. Therefore to 
be more rational, the present value of the obtained synergies was estimated using the 
merged firm’s cost of capital. The table below summarizes the synergies realized from 
the valuation which was done using APV. 
Table 10. Synergy Estimates and Composition in Millions 
  EV  EVwith Synergy Synergy Value PV of Synergy % 
Cost Synergies 115,659.25 118,983.10 3,323.86 2,399.09 45.2% 
Tax Synergies 115,659.25 117,782.88 2,123.64 1,532.80 28.9% 
Capex Synergies 115,659.25 117,565.79 1906.55 1,376.10 25.9% 
Total synergy PV 
   
5,307.99 
 Restructuring 
   
(391) 
 Integration  costs (1,178) 
Net synergy       3,738.99   
 
   From the table above, it can be seen that the highest synergy will be captured from 
cost savings while the second highest from the low taxes that Liberty Global plc. will 
remit. The re-registration of the merged firm from the US to the UK will mechanically 
be of a certain degree of benefit. The total present value of synergies is about 4.4% of 
the total firm value. Given this, it’s obvious then that the restructuring and integration 
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costs which represent 6.5% of the purchase price and 30% of the total present value of 
synergies are to be offset. Cost synergies are to be realized mainly from the bundling 
services of which Virgin Media is more efficient, having the most up-to-date quad-play 
in the UK as well as across European peers. The bundling reduces costs of distribution 
of operations separately, therefore reducing customer churn. The other components 
of cost synergies include LLU and MVNO as per Goldman Sach’s Global Investment 
Research (2013) which shows that MVNO accounts for about 23% of cost synergies 
from mergers with firms in the UK, while the LLU accounts for roughly 21%. Figure 16 
below therefore shows a more detailed synergy breakdown. 
Figure 16. Synergy Breakdown 
 
 
5.4. Splitting Synergies 
   The splitting of synergies should be done in a fair manner as per literature, in relation 
to the contribution made on the basis of idiosyncratic strength. In the case of Liberty 
Global plc., of the two subsidiaries, Virgin Media seems to efficiently generate the 
drivers that realize  the synergies at hand compared to Liberty Global Inc. Virgin 
Media’s operational strength in bundling and mobile services if adopted by LGI’s 
subsidiaries will earn them higher gains considering the larger customer base and 
current churn. Technically, it would be fair for Virgin Media to have a higher share of 
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upper hand in the distribution of the synergies. In this case, Liberty Global Inc. during 
negotiations already secured negotiation power higher than that of Virgin Media. 
Based on these ratios, Table 11 shows the amount given to each firm assuming full 
integration and restructuring. 
Table 11. Net Synergy Distribution 
 Liberty Global Virgin Media 
Negotiation Power 0.74 0.26 
Net Synergy proportion  ($ million) 2,766.85 972.14 
Equity MV  ($ million) 2,210 3,157.60 
Net Synergy-Equity ratio 1.25 0.30 
   
 The net synergy-equity ratio is higher for Liberty Global considering its debt 
dominated capital structure. This analytically implies that existing shareholders are to 
receive 125% of their net worth from synergies or in other words, their stake may be 
almost doubled while those of Virgin Media will increase theirs by slightly more than a 
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6.  The Merger 
   This section analyzes the financial structure of deal and its worthiness. As in every 
other investment, expectations are that value is conserved or created. M&A deals each 
have idiosyncratic forms of settlement and should therefore be assessed on those 
terms. 
   Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. entered into an agreement and announced a 
possible merger on the 5th of February 2013. The negotiations that begun during the 
last quarter of 2012 were then finalized and terms of the merger made by the firms’ 
respective boards of directors were released in a statement on the 6th of February to 
the public, subject regulatory and shareholder approvals. 
   As per agreement, the combination of the two firms would then be under a new 
parent firm called Liberty Global Corporation Limited, which would be re-registered as 
a U.K. public limited company and renamed Liberty Global plc. prior to the completion 
of the merger, which was completed on the 7th of June, 2013. The parent firm is to 
remain listed on NASDAQ. 
 
6.1.     The Deal Procedure and Consideration 
   The friendly merger of the firms follows a horizontal form which occurs when 
competitors or peers combine and may result in an increase of market power, as is the 
case at hand. A more specific form considering each firm’s different local markets 
would be that of a market-extension merger, which as the name suggests, is the 
merging of two firms operating in different markets. Deals that increase market power 
are usually assessed on the basis of whether anticompetitive effects are incidentally 
induced and if it so happens, the deal may be nullified or opposed on antitrust grounds 
by regulatory bodies. Liberty Global Inc. has reputable market share across European 
countries and in order to expand its footprint, the EU Merger Regulation of the 
European Commission (EC) had to be undertaken and followed. The deal was therefore 
under assessment based on turnover and the aforementioned antitrust issue.  
   Most mergers that have taken place over the past years have been of no threat to 
the market. The assessment follows two phases; Phase I which takes the Commission 
25 working days to decide whether to grant approval, and Phase II to start an in-depth 
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investigation (European Commission, 2013). The merger was later approved in April 
confirming that it would not spur competition issues as the firms each operated in 
different member states and further, that the combined firm’s limited market position 
in the wholesale of TV channels in the UK and Ireland. 
   Besides being ratified by the EC, both firms’ majority shareholders had to approve 
the deal on the basis of benefits liable to their respective stakes. The agreement 
provided that Liberty Global and Virgin Media would become wholly owned 
subsidiaries of Liberty Global plc. through a series of mergers involving wholly owned 
subsidiaries of Liberty Global. The form of payment agreed was a mix of stock and 
cash. 
   The mergers followed that each outstanding share of Virgin Media common stock 
would be exchanged for 0.2582 of a class A ordinary share of the merged firm, 0.1928 
of a class C ordinary share of the merged firm and $17.50 in cash, without interest; and 
each outstanding share of Liberty Global common stock would be exchanged for one 
ordinary share of the corresponding class of Liberty Global plc. ordinary shares. For 
each share of the Series A, B and C common stock, a par value of $0.01 per share of 
Liberty Global would be converted into the right to receive one Class A, B and C 
ordinary share of the merged firm respectively. Each Class A ordinary share of merged 
firm would be entitled to one vote per share, while each Class B ordinary share would 
be entitled to ten votes per share and lastly, each Class C ordinary share would be 
issued without voting rights (Liberty Global, 2013).  
   Liberty Global’s Chairman of the Board, John C. Malone happens to be the largest 
shareholder and beneficiary across stock series B and C, with the highest overall voting 
power of 36.6% while the second highest voting power of 4.5% is that of William H. 
Gates III, popularly known as Bill Gates. Other majority shareholders include 
individuals, institutions and well-known peer, Comcast Corporation (see appendix for 
details). 
   The cash component of the merger would be funded through a combination of 
available liquidity of the two firms and debt financing.  
If assuming the merger had been completed on the 31st of December 2012, and all of 
the $1 billion principal amount of the 6.50% convertible senior notes due 2016 of 
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Virgin Media were then converted into the per share consideration to be received by 
its shareholders, it would mean that: 
 83.5 million Class A ordinary shares and 62.4 million Class C ordinary shares of 
the merged firm would have been issued to them, representing roughly 36% of 
the merged firm’s shares. 
 142.3 million Class A ordinary shares, 10.2 million Class B ordinary shares and 
106.4 million Class C ordinary shares of the merged firm would have been 
issued to Liberty Global shareholders, representing roughly 64% of the merged 
firm’s shares. 
 
   Given the aforementioned assumptions and the closing prices of Series A and C 
Liberty Global common stock on the 29th of April, 2013, the total value of the cash and 
stock consideration to be received by Virgin Media stockholders would have been 
roughly $16.04 billion, including approximately $5.9 billion of cash consideration. Had 
the merger occurred on the 31st of December, 2012, the balance brought forth of 
indebtedness of the combined firm would then move to $40.06 billion as a result of a 
$2.94 billion increase. 
   Upon consummation, holders of the $853.9 million (representing more than 85% of 
the initial issue of $1 billion) aggregate principal amount of Virgin Media’s 6.50% 
convertible senior notes due 2016 elected in accordance to the agreement of having 
the right to exchange the notes for 13.8302 Liberty Global class A ordinary shares, 
10.3271 Liberty Global class C ordinary shares and $937.37 in cash (without interest) 
for each $1,000 in principal amount of Convertible Notes exchanged. 
Besides the requirement of approval of the offers to Virgin Media shareholders, the 
shareholders were also given a merger-related compensation proposal which required 
them to approve on an advisory non-binding basis, the compensation that would be 
paid or be payable to Virgin Media’s executive officers in relation with the merger.  
   As it is common for the board to preserve an external valuation firm, such as 
investment bank or a firm that specifically deals with valuation to evaluate the terms 
and price of the transaction, the firm is expected to give a fairness opinion in which it 
may confirm that the offer is in a range that may be determined as accurate (Gaughan, 
2002). 
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6.1.1. Fairness Opinions 
    In connection with the merger, Liberty Global’s financial advisor Credit Suisse 
Securities (USA) LLC, delivered an opinion on the 5th of February, 2013 to the board of 
directors the fairness from the financial point of view of the consideration. On the 
other hand, Virgin Media’s advisors Goldman, Sachs & Co. and J.P. Morgan Securities 
LLC rendered their opinion to the Virgin Media board of directors on the fairness of the 
consideration. Of the two, Virgin Media retained J.P. Morgan Securities LLC as its 
advisor throughout the deal and agreed to pay a transaction fee of $25 million of 
which is due upon consummation. The opinions were in no way to be taken as a 
recommendation on how shareholders would vote concerning the approval of the 
deal.  
6.1.2.    Interests of Directors and Executive officers and an Advisory Board 
   Taking into account the recommendation by the board of directors regarding the 
merger, it may be that executive officers and directors may have certain interests in 
the deal that may be different from, or in line with those of the firms’ shareholders. 
The Liberty Global interests included continued service of all its executive officers by 
the combined group, the continued service of all the directors as the directors of the 
combined firm and the compensation of former directors and officers by the surviving 
corporations. The interests of Virgin Media concerning compensation were similar to 
those of Liberty Global and in addition to that, the bonus plans made prior to the 
merger were proposed to continue and that if any change in control were to occur and 
an executive officer’s employment terminated, the executive would be entitled to 
severance benefits as per existing employment agreement.  
Virgin Media revealed that stockholders owning a total of roughly 217 million of its 
shares voted to adopt the Merger Agreement, representing nearly 80.22% of the 
shares of the Company’s common stock outstanding as of the 4th of June 2013 (Virgin 
Media, 2013). 
   Prior to closing, the merged firm is to adopt a UK advisory board to provide the board 
of directors with general guidance on UK  issues such as political, economic, cultural 
and regulatory matters. A UK resident member of the Virgin Media board of directors 
is to serve on this advisory board following the closing of the merger (Liberty Global, 
2013).  
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6.2. Closing the deal 
   Upon closure the stock and cash mix was valued at $24 billion making Virgin Media 
the 14th market in which Liberty Global will operate. The consideration made 
technically reflects a premium of 24% to Virgin Media’s pre-deal share price (implied 
share price of $47.87). At that time, the implied purchase before incorporating 
transaction costs and other expenses represented an equity value of roughly $16 billion 
(based on pre-deal shares outstanding) and an enterprise value of roughly $23.3 
billion, including debt. Virgin Media’s CEO, Neil Berkett was replaced by Tom 
Mockridge upon completion as per pre-deal agreement with compensation of $19.6 
million in severance and $67.2 million in other options and rewards. The new CEO is to 
report to Liberty Global CEO who is also the merged firm’s CEO, Mike Fries.  
Liberty Global plc. plans to maintain the corporate culture of Virgin Media and they 
therefore justify the selection of the new CEO stating that his 15-year experience and 
talent of outstanding leadership in the industry will be beneficial to Virgin Media’s next  
phase of growth. 
   The shares of both Virgin Media Inc. and Liberty Global Inc. were, under securities 
laws deregistered and trading ceased upon closure on the 7th of June, 2013 on 
NASDAQ while those of Virgin Media listed on the London Stock Exchange were 
cancelled on the 10th of June, 2013. The shares of the merged firm were open for trade 
on NASDAQ on the 10th of June, 2013 maintaining the tickers previously used by 
Liberty Global Inc. Liberty Global plc. intends to get listed on the London Stock 
Exchange in the long run. 
6.3.  Justifying the Premium 
   The motive behind handsome premiums paid has all to do with the estimated 
expected synergies. Synergies are usually of benefit to the acquiring firm if they indeed 
are realized and are greater than the actual premium paid over the target’s value. An 
acquiring firm has to maintain or improve its value in order for it to have made a good 
purchase and overall, improve shareholders’ net worth. Empirical studies show a 
negative relationship between premiums and share price performance (Sahni and 
Sirower, 2006). Synergies that can be realized in the short run have a positively 
significant impact on the acquiring firm’s expected NPV than those to be realized in the 
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long run and also increase shareholders’ confidence on the basis of the premium 
justification. 
   Highly acquisitive firm Liberty Global Inc. has closed a number of accretive deals over 
the past five years which gives it enough experience to be placed at favorable and 
rational negotiations. The firm had earlier probed the likeliness of merging with Virgin 
Media a few years ago and its current tax state partially prompted the proposal of a 
possible deal. Offers earlier showed premiums of as low as 12% with Virgin Media 
raising the bar higher. The table below shows a relative composition of the 
consideration and Shareholder Value at Risk (SVAR). LGI’s newly found information on 
Virgin Media gave the company an insight on possible synergies to be realized, 
therefore eventually offering a higher price with the implied pre-deal price per share 
reflecting the 24% premium.  
 
Table 12. Merger Consideration and SVAR 
Merger Consideration Composition and SVAR 
Premium 24% 
Stock percentage of consideration 62.5% 
Cash percentage of consideration 37.5% 
SVAR 11% 
 
   Although Liberty Global has a high probability of realizing synergies, the magnitude 
of the risk should be evaluated using the Shareholder Value at Risk (SVAR) which is ‘the 
premium paid for the acquisition divided by the market value of the acquiring 
company before the announcement is made.’ (Sahni and Sirower, 2006). In this case, 
the SVAR computed is 11% implying that if no synergies are realized post-merger, 11% 
of the shareholders’ net worth is at risk. Considering LGI’s equity value as at 31st of 
December, 2012, it would mean that $242.5 million would be at risk.  
As shown earlier, Liberty Global Inc. has a higher proportion of the merged firm as well 
as the equity. Given that the transaction is financed with 62.5% of stock and Liberty 
Global Inc. has a higher proportion of the equity in the merged firm, its shareholders 
will bear the larger part of the synergy risk. 
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6.3.1. The Synergy-Premium Model 
   As per literature review, further assessment of the target firm given its SVAR can be 
made regarding earnings by a model with combinations of cost reductions and 
revenue improvements that would justify the premium offered.  
In the current case as seen earlier, cost synergies are likely to be realized than revenue 
synergies through operations. Therefore, cost reductions are solely used to obtain the 
acquisition premium. Using the shown equation below: 
         [
 
     
] 
 
Where        is the percentage cost synergy,    the premium and   pre-tax profit 
margin. 
   Given Virgin Media’s pre-merger pre-tax profit margin of 17.11%, the %SynC 
obtained is therefore 4.96%. This is the cost reduction minimum requirement in order 
to generate enough profit to justify the premium. This also implies that the cost 
reductions should be more than expectations of those in the standalone valuations. 
Given that the operations are similar and Virgin Media as a standalone firm has been 
more cost efficient and is endowed with most of the resources that Liberty Global Inc. 
lacks, it then proves the feasibility of the %SynC obtained.  
Using the MTP line would mean incorporating possible revenue synergies and in this 
case, it is assumed that in the absence of cost synergies, it is required that the 
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Figure 17. The Synergy-Premium model 
 
 
   The synergy combinations show that the 4.96% meets the premium of 24% and the 
optimal point is that marked above the line with a star. However, given the type 
operations the firms are involved in, they are bound to a certain range of which they 
cannot exceed. The plausible box shows the upper limit of cost reductions to be 6% 
while the corresponding revenue improvements if given a mix of 3.2%, a range in 
which the optimal point lies as well. This falls in line with the actual growth rate of the 
firm’s revenues in their pro-forma statements. 
6.3.2. What does all this mean for shareholders? 
   Upon announcement of the merger, Virgin Media’s share price shot up by 18% a day 
later making the 24% premium offer negligible. However, the day after saw the share 
price falling from the 18% increase in closing price by 1.6%. On the other hand, Liberty 
Global Inc. had a drop of 2.7% in share price (Liberty Global’s Series A share price 
was $69.46 and Series C share price was $64.50 as at 4th February, 2013). This verifies 
empirical studies that have over time shown that the impact of acquisition news to 
investors is higher on the acquiring firm than the target firm. The mid-negotiation 
period had both firms’ shares performing incredibly well compared to the 
announcement period (Liberty Global’s Series A share price was $75.18 and Series C 
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As per agreement, the higher stake is taken by Liberty Global in both equity and 
negotiation. Currently, both shareholders seem to be better off than earlier this year 
with the Liberty Global plc. shares trading above $76 with variations in prices of 
roughly -0.02% to 0.04%. 
   Following closure of the merger, Liberty Global plc. announced the approval of a $3.5 
billion stock repurchase program over the next two years making the previously 
announced share buyback of $1 billion of Liberty Global Inc. before the merger 
inapplicable. The Program may be achieved through open market transactions and/or 
privately negotiated transactions, which may include derivative transactions. The 
timing of the repurchase of shares pursuant to the Program will depend on a variety of 
factors, including market conditions and applicable law.  (Liberty Global plc., 2013). 
This strategy will be of high benefit to the Enterprise Value of the firm and most 
importantly, its market capitalization making shareholders wealthier. Figure 18 shows 
the NPV to Liberty Global Inc. shareholders. The computed NPV from the overall deal is 
$10,889 million from the forecasted cash flows over a five year trend.  
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6.4.  The merger financing ‘after shock’ 
   The cash composition of the merger besides the two firms’ liquidity consisted of 
senior secured notes and loans of which are due after the year 2021. Considering the 
debt ratio of Liberty Global Inc., the merger agreement included Virgin Media issuing 
part of the debt therefore leveraging it up. This although providing the desired debt 
ratio for the next two operating years, has seen Virgin Media’s credit rating downgrade 
from two to three notches by Fitch. Virgin Media’s long-term debt rating moved from 
BB+ to B+. Liberty Global is currently under review as well for a possible downgrade. 
This will mean higher interest payments and probability of default, which if not 
managed may hurt shareholders’ interests. However, given Virgin Media’s traditional 
capital structure optimization strategy which involves share buybacks, increase in 
liquidity and debt repayment, if maintained by the new board of directors, the merged 
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7.  Conclusion 
   M&A activity has over the past two decades been the norm of investors worldwide 
with many motives including expansion, diversification and value maximization. 
Macroeconomically, cross-border M&A may be classified as a form of FDI as the 
expansion of a firm into another economy contributes to the domestic productivity of 
the economic sectors of the firm’s respective operation(s). 
This work studies a merger that has been known as one of the most tremendous in the 
TMT sector between Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. The acquiring firm 
Liberty Global Inc. is known for its acquisitive strategy in search for any accretive deals 
while diversifying its operations across markets, mainly in Europe. The merger proves 
empirical evidence of acquiring firms’ shareholders being highly impacted by events 
compared to those of target firms. 
Given the current competition, capital intensity and innovation in the industry, it is 
only logic for firms to merge in anticipation of a greater force. The merger between the 
two firms after a close assessment proves that both companies have the potential of 
increasing their enterprise values by more than half and therefore, their market 
capitalization may be higher as they draw closer to maturity. The capital intensity if 
shared may be reduced creating cost synergies which may in turn largely contribute to 
the profit margins of Liberty Global plc. 
 Additionally, relocation to the UK proves to be beneficial to the American firm on the 
basis of tax savings. Although slightly offset by lower tax shields, the synergy analysis 
proved a decent gain. Revenue synergies may sprout however, it is not certain 
considering the current situation of both firms, there are no plans of newer product 
releases except for those already launched pre-merger. 
Given the customer base of both firms, Liberty Global plc. is currently the largest cable 
provider globally with the largest market share across Europe and strong revenues 
from five of the strongest markets in Europe. 
The future of the firm entirely or mostly depends on the management and if Virgin 
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8. Appendices 
Appendix A: Liberty Global Inc. Brands and Regions/Countries of Operation 
Liberty Global Inc. 
 
The UPC brand covers countries; Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Switzerland. Unity Media operates in Germany; Telenet in Belgium; VTR in Chile; 
Liberty in Puerto Rico and Chellomedia in Europe. 
Chellomedia is the content division of Liberty Global and a leading international producer and 
distributor of TV channels and a provider of advanced digital services, such as ad sales and broadcast 
solutions to a portfolio of international channel operators. The Chellomedia division ("Chellomedia") 
operates its programming businesses in Europe, Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. It also 
owns joint venture interests in certain programming businesses and operates a series of these on behalf 
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Appendix B:  Liberty Global Average Revenue Share of Segments,  RGU by product, 





Source: Liberty Global, 2012. 
*The momentum is a result  of triple-play enhanced products. 
Bundling Opportunity and Customer Base in millions 
 
 
Liberty Global lacks Quad-Play bundling and still has a large share of its customer base subscribing for 
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Appendix C: Liberty Global Inc.  SWOT  Analysis 
STRENGTHS 
• Largest broadband provider outside the US. 
• Strong Market Position. 
• Market diversity across 13 countries. 
• Well established corporate identity. 
• Admirable Revenue growth. 
• Consistent Stock Price Performance. 
WEAKNESSES 
• High CapEx. 
• Highly Leveraged, above industry average. 
• Weak Return on Equity. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Mobile Digital Communications. 
• Accretive M&A opportunities. 
• Good prospects for the cable market in 
Europe. 
• Quad-play bundles. 
THREATS 
• Strict European Market Regulations. 
• Foreign Currency Risk. 
• Tight Market Competition. 
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Appendix D: Virgin Media Churn Rates Per Bundle 
 
Source: Virgin Media, 2012. 
The above chart clearly shows that there are higher costs bourne by the firm for unbundled products 
than there are for bundled. If more customers subscribe to triple-play and quad-play, churn rates are 
lower therefore reducing operation expenses as well as CapEx. 
“Integrated customers are likely to have much lower churn characteristics than a standalone mobile 
contract or fixed broadband customer given greater switching complexity, yielding significant cost 
savings for converged operators. These cost savings can either be recycled into lower prices, 
furtheraccelerating the uptake of integrated bundles, or into higher margins, strengthening the 
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Appendix E:  Virgin Media Inc. SWOT Analysis 
STRENGTHS 
• All consumer services are rebranded under 
the ‘Virgin’ brand. 
• Expensive Hi-tech and high speed 
infrastructure owned by VMED may be seen 
as a barrier to entry. 
• Virgin Media owns and operates its own 
fibre-optic cable network, the only national 
cable network in the United Kingdom. 
• Operational Efficiency. 
WEAKNESSES 
• Reliance on third-party suppliers. 
• High CapEx. 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Increasing demand for Mobile Digital 
Communications. 
•  Internet television brings higher demand 
for internet services through broadband 
carriers. 
•  More penetration and tieups with other 
international companies 
THREATS 
• Tight Market Competition. 
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Appendix F: LGI Forward Looking Statements 
Over the next few years, we expect to continue to generate organic growth in our consolidated 
revenue and operating cash flow. We expect this growth to come primarily from organic increases in 
our digital cable, broadband internet and telephony RGUs, as we expect that our analog cable RGUs 
will decline and that our overall ARPU will remain relatively unchanged during this timeframe, 
primarily driven by growth in our operations in Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
In addition, we currently expect that the continued expansion of our mobile service offerings will (i) 
positively impact our revenue and, towards the end of this timeframe, our OCF growth and (ii) 
positively impact our subscriber retention rates. Additionally, we plan to continue improving our 
competitive position, with (i) further planned launches of our Horizon TV platform, as discussed 
above, and (ii) upgrades to our network capacity in Germany and other markets. While we expect 
that these and other initiatives will require significant additions to our property and equipment, we 
currently expect that our total additions to property and equipment as a percentage of our revenue 
will continue to decline over the next few years. For additional information concerning our property 
and equipment additions, including our 2013 expectations for the UPC/Unity Division , Telenet and 
the VTR Group , see Liquidity and Capital Resources - Consolidated Cash Flow Statements below. 
Our expectations with respect to the items discussed in this paragraph are subject to competitive, 
economic, technological, political and regulatory developments and other factors outside of our 
control. Accordingly, no assurance can be given that actual results in future periods will not differ 
materially from our expectations. 
The video, broadband internet and telephony businesses in which we operate are capital intensive. 
Significant additions to our property and equipment are required to add customers to our networks 
and to upgrade our broadband communications networks and customer premises equipment to 
enhance our service offerings and improve the customer experience, including expenditures for 
equipment and labor costs. Significant competition, the introduction of new technologies, the 
expansion of existing technologies such as fiber-to-the-home, or adverse regulatory developments 
could cause us to decide to undertake previously unplanned upgrades of our networks and customer 
premises equipment in the impacted markets. In addition, no assurance can be given that any future 
upgrades will generate a positive return or that we will have adequate capital available to finance 
such future upgrades. If we are unable to, or elect not to, pay for costs associated with adding new 
customers, expanding or upgrading our networks or making our other planned or unplanned additions 
to our property and equipment, our growth could be limited and our competitive position could be 
harmed. 
Programming costs, which represent a significant portion of our operating costs, are expected to rise 
in future periods as a result of (i) growth in digital cable services, in combination with the 
introduction of Horizon TV, and (ii) price increases. In addition, we are subject to inflationary 
pressures with respect to our labor and other costs and foreign currency exchange risk with respect to 
costs and expenses that are denominated in currencies other than the respective functional currencies 
of our operating segments ( non-functional currency expenses ). Any cost increases that we are not 
able to pass on to our subscribers through service rate increases would result in increased pressure on 
our operating margin. We expect that the 2013 operating cash flow margin of (i) the UPC/Unity 
Division will remain relatively unchanged, (ii) Telenet will decline slightly and (iii) the VTR 
Group will increase somewhat, each as compared to 2012 . With regard to Telenet , the expected 
slight margin decline is due largely to the expected impact of the increasing mobile business. As 
discussed under Overview and Discussion and Analysis of our Reportable Segments - General above, 
most of our broadband communications operations are experiencing significant competition. 
Sustained or increased competition, particularly in combination with unfavorable regulatory, 
economic or political developments, could adversely impact the operating cash flow margins of our 
reportable segments. 
It is possible that (i) the interest rates on any new borrowings could be higher than the current interest 
rates on our existing indebtedness and (ii) the interest rates incurred on our variable-rate indebtedness 
could increase in future periods. As further discussed under Qualitative and Quantitative Disclosures 
about Market Risk below, we use derivative instruments to manage our interest rate risks. 
Due largely to the fact that we seek to maintain our debt at levels that provide for attractive equity 
returns, as discussed under Liquidity and Capital Resources - Capitalization below, we expect that we 
will continue to report significant levels of interest expense for the foreseeable future. For 
information concerning our expectations with respect to trends that may affect certain aspects of our 
operating results in future periods, see the discussion under Overview above. For information 
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concerning the reasons for changes in specific line items in our consolidated statements of 
operations, see the discussion under Discussion and Analysis of our Reportable 
Segments and Discussion and Analysis of our Consolidated Operating Results above… 
… Although our consolidated operating subsidiaries have generated cash from operating activities, 
the terms of the instruments governing the indebtedness of certain of these subsidiaries, 
including Telenet , UPC Holding , UPC Broadband Holding, Unitymedia KabelBW , Liberty Puerto 
Rico and VTR Wireless , may restrict our ability to access the assets of these subsidiaries. As set 
forth in the table below, these subsidiaries accounted for a significant portion of our consolidated 
cash and cash equivalents at December 31, 2012 . In addition, our ability to access the liquidity of 
these and other subsidiaries may be limited by tax considerations, the presence of noncontrolling 
interests and other factors… 
…Although substantially all of our revenue and operating income is generated outside the United 
States, we are subject to potential current U.S. income tax on this income due to our being 
a U.S. corporation. Our worldwide effective tax rate is reduced under a provision in U.S.tax law that 
defers the imposition of U.S. tax on certain foreign active income until that income is repatriated to 
the United States. Any repatriation of assets currently held in foreign jurisdictions or recognition of 
foreign income that fails to meet the U.S. tax requirements related to deferral of U.S. income tax may 
result in a higher effective tax rate for our company. 
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Appendix G:  Virgin Media’s Safe Harbor Statement 
Various Statements contained in this document constitute “forward-looking statements” as that term 
is defined under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Words like “believe,” 
“anticipate,” “should,” “intend,” “plan,” “will,” “expects,” “estimates,” “projects,” “positioned,” 
“think,” “strategy,” and similar expressions identify these forward-looking statements, which involve 
known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause our actual results, 
performance or achievements or industry results to be materially different from those contemplated, 
projected, forecasted, estimated or budgeted, whether expressed or implied, by these forward-looking 
statements. These factors, among others, include the following: 
We have entered in to a Merger Agreement with Liberty Global, Inc., or Liberty Global, which is 
subject to certain conditions, and as a result the merger may not be consummated; our operations, 
both before and after consummation of the merger, will be impacted; We operate in highly 
competitive markets which may lead to a decrease in our revenue, increased costs, increased 
customer churn or a reduction in the rate of customer acquisition; The sectors in which we compete 
are subject to rapid and significant changes in technology, and the effect of technological changes on 
our businesses cannot be predicted; Adverse economic developments could reduce customer 
spending for our TV, broadband, and telephony services and increase churn, either of which could 
therefore have a material adverse effect on our revenue; 
Our fixed line telephony revenue is declining and unlikely to improve; A failure in our network and 
information systems, whether caused by a natural failure or a security breach, could significantly 
disturb our operations, which could have a material adverse effect on those operations, our business, 
our results of operations and financial condition; Unauthorized access to our network resulting in 
piracy could result in a loss of revenue; 
We rely on third-party suppliers and contractors to provide necessary hardware, software or 
operational support and are reliant on them in a way that could economically disadvantage us; 
The “Virgin” brand is not under our control and the activities of the Virgin Group and other licensees 
could have a material adverse effect on the goodwill of customers towards us as a licensee; 
Our inability to obtain popular programming or to obtain it at a reasonable cost could potentially 
have a material adverse effect on the number of customers or reduce margins; Our consumer mobile 
service relies on EE's network to carry its communications traffic; We do not insure the underground 
portion of our cable network and various pavement-based electronics associated with our cable 
network; We are subject to currency and interest rate risks; We are subject to tax in more than one 
tax jurisdiction and our structure poses various tax risks; 
Acquisitions and other strategic transactions present many risks, and we may not realize the financial 
and strategic goals that were contemplated at the time of any transaction; Adverse changes in our 
financial outlook may result in negative or unexpected tax consequences which could adversely 
affect our net income; We are subject to significant regulation, and changes in U.K. and EU laws, 
regulations or governmental policy affecting the conduct of our business, which may have a material 
adverse effect on our ability to set prices, enter new markets or control our costs; We have substantial 
indebtedness that may have a material adverse effect on our available cash flow, our ability to obtain 
additional financing if necessary in the future, our flexibility in reacting to competitive and 
technological change and our operations; We may not be able to fund our debt service obligations in 
the future; The covenants under our debt agreements place certain limitations on our ability to 
finance future operations and how we manage our business; and We are a holding company 
dependent upon cash flow from subsidiaries to meet our obligations. 
These and other factors are discussed in more detail under “Risk Factors” in Item 1A and elsewhere 
in this annual report on Form 10-K. We assume no obligation to update our forward-looking 
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Appendix H: Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. Peers 
Ticker Name Beta 
CMCSA US Equity COMCAST CORP-CLASS A 1.099903 
DTV US Equity DIRECTV 0.841796 
TWC US Equity TIME WARNER CABLE 0.847285 
CVC US Equity CABLEVISION SYSTEMS-NY GRP-A 1.433168 
CHTR US Equity CHARTER COMMUNICATION-A 0.692463 
DISH US Equity DISH NETWORK CORP-A 0.979725 
VZ US Equity VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC 0.543975 
T US Equity AT&T INC 0.605475 
KD8 GR Equity KABEL DEUTSCHLAND HOLDING AG 0.408153 
SIRI US Equity SIRIUS XM RADIO INC 1.035143 
SATS US Equity ECHOSTAR CORP-A 1.339477 
BSY LN Equity BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING GRO 0.594296 
SKYD GR Equity SKY DEUTSCHLAND AG 1.157479 
TIVO US Equity TIVO INC 1.447975 
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Appendix I: Industry Unlevered Beta Estimation with a broader selection of Peers 
  Mkt Cap 
 (in $million) 
NI beta Unlevered D/E 
Liberty Global, Inc.    18,902 322 1.58 0.12 12.3 
Comcast Corp  109,195 6,203 1.11 0.62 0.8 
Directv*  32,283 2,949 0.9 -0.42 -3.16 
Time Warner Cable Inc   27,609 2,155 0.75 0.17 3.5 
British Sky Broadcasting Group PLC   21,332 952 0.61 0.13 3.7 
DISH Network Corp   18,113 636 1.28 0.00 307.9 
Virgin Media Inc   13,278 2,852 1.66 0.57 1.9 
Charter Communications Inc   10,283 -304 0.79 0.01 86 
Cablevision Systems Corp   3,918 233 1.48 1.48 0 
Cogeco Cable Inc.   2,156 199 0.33 0.1 2.3 
Tivo, Inc.   1,455 -5 1.51 1.01 0.5 
BT  34,000  1.28 0.17 6.66 
*excluded from estimation 
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Appendix J: Liberty Global Inc. Income Statement (in $million) 
Historic Forecast 
  























   




























3% 11% 0% 2% 2% 5% 3% 3% 4% 
VTR 
 





14% 11% 6% 6% 5% 5% 3% 3% 4% 
Other 
 





12% 6% 2% -42% 137% 5% 3% 3% 27% 




























22% 12% 8% 10% 10% 8% 8% 8% 9% 
Telenet 
 





2% 15% 4% 6% 6% 4% 4% 4% 5% 
VTR 
 





11% 14% 16% 18% 18% 16% 16% 16% 17% 





18% 7% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% 


















23% 15% 9% 5% 7% 5% 3% 3% 4% 













19% 12% 9% 8% 5% 5% 3% 3% 4% 













13% 9% 10% -1% -3% -7% -14% -37% -16% 
Other Operating Expenses -2.9 4.2 -2.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 



























45% 25% 9% 12% 20% 16% 15% 26% 19% 
























59% 13% 15% 7% 5% -1% -1% -1% 0% 
Interest And Investment Income 46.1 36.2 73.2 42.3 21.37 57.75 -15.57 -90.35 -166.62 
 
























64% 11% 18% 8% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Other Non-Operating Expenses, Total -917.7 
-
1,394.7
0 -725.9 -529.1 -422.69 -379.95 -341.54 -307.00 -275.96 
 
   
52% -48% -27% -20% -10% -10% -10% -10% -10% 
 
M&A: A Case Study on Liberty Global Inc. and Virgin Media Inc. | Elsa Nabenge 89 
 
Other Non-Operating Income 
(Expenses) 4.8 -2.80 -6.60 -1.10 
 
0.22 0.48 1.06 2.34 5.15 
 
   
-158% 136% -83% 
 
-120% 120% 120% 120% 120% 120% 
Merger & Restructuring Charges -21.1 -93.7 -50.6 -83.3 
 





344% -46% 65% 
 
15% -65% -65% -65% -65% 
 
Impairment Of Goodwill -118.8 -26.3 -15.9 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
Gain (Loss) On Sale Of Investments -96.4 127.7 -67.9 -86.4 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
   
-2.32 -1.53 0.27 
 
-1.50 0.80 0.40 0.40 0.40 
 
Other Unusual Items, Total -34.5 -31.20 -230.10 -215.50 
 
-43.10 -8.62 -1.72 -0.34 -0.07 
 
   
-0.10 6.38 -0.06 
 
-0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -80% 
EBT, INCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS -904.9 
-
1,150.6
0 -575.8 -483.3 
 





27% -50% -16% 
 
-115% 660% 79% 48% 63% 
 
Income Tax Expense 805.1 196.9 -231.7 -89 
 




    
 532.00 
    
Earnings From Continuing Operations -99.8 -953.7 -807.5 -572.3 
 
53.22 390.49 725.02 1071.78 1747.71 
 
   
856% -15% -29% 
 
-49% -69% -109% -149% -189% 139% 
EARNINGS FROM DISCOUNTINUED 
OPERATIONS 113.9 
1,517.7
0 136.5 959.6 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
   
12.32 -0.91 6.03 
 
-1.00 
     
Minority Interest In Earnings -426.2 -175.8 -101.7 -64.5 
 
-44.78 -33.77 -27.50 -24.04 -22.46 
 
   
-0.59 -0.42 -0.37 
 
-0.31 -0.25 -0.19 -0.13 -0.07 -16% 
NET INCOME 
 
-412.1 388.2 -772.7 322.8 
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Appendix K: Liberty Global Inc. Balance Sheet (in $million) 
Historic Forecast 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cash And Equivalents 
       
3,269.60  
       
3,847.50  
       
1,651.20  
       
2,038.90  - - - - - 
Trading Asset Securities 
            
153.60  
               
90.60  
            
155.80  
            
191.30  - - - - - 
TOTAL CASH AND SHORT TERM 
INVESTMENTS 
       
3,423.20  
       
3,938.10  
       
1,807.00  
       
2,230.20  - - - - - 
Accounts Receivable 
       
1,016.70  
            
922.30  
            
910.50  
       
1,031.00  
       
1,103.17  
         
1,158.33  
         
1,216.24  
         
1,252.73  
         
1,290.31  
TOTAL RECEIVABLES 
       
1,016.70  
            
922.30  
            
910.50  
       
1,031.00  
       
1,103.17  
         
1,158.33  
         
1,216.24  
         
1,252.73  
         
1,290.31  
Deferred Tax Assets, Current 
            
504.20  
            
300.10  
            
345.20  
               
98.40  
                         
-    
                          
-    
                          
-    
                          
-    
                          
-    
Restricted Cash 
                         
-    
                         
-    
                         
-    
                         
-    - - - - - 
Other Current Assets 
            
334.10  
            
266.90  
            
712.40  
            
366.20  
            
402.19  
             
441.72  
             
485.14  
             
532.82  
             
585.19  
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 
       
5,278.20  
       
5,432.70  
       
3,775.10  
       
3,725.80  
       
2,608.53  
         
2,758.38  
         
2,917.63  
         
3,038.29  
         
3,165.82  
Gross Property Plant And Equipment 
    
22,152.40  
    
18,980.40  
    
21,023.50  
    
21,817.00  
    
21,785.08  
      
22,032.83  
      
23,208.77  
      
23,981.82  






     
(7,868.10) 
     
(8,155.10) 
     
(8,379.40) 
     
(8,367.14) 
       
(8,462.29) 
       
(8,913.95) 
       
(9,210.86) 
       
(9,992.01) 
NET PROPERTY PLANT AND 
EQUIPMENT 
    
12,010.70  
    
11,112.30  
    
12,868.40  
    
13,437.60  
    
13,417.94  
      
13,570.53  
      
14,294.83  
      
14,770.96  




                  
0.16  
                  
0.04  
                
(0.00) 
                   
0.01  
                   
0.05  
                   
0.03  
                   
0.08  
Goodwill 
    
13,353.80  
    
11,734.70  
    
13,289.30  
    
13,877.60  
    
13,951.86  
      
13,951.86  
      
13,951.86  
      
13,951.86  
      
13,951.86  
Long-Term Investments 
       
1,195.20  
       
1,265.80  
       
1,519.60  
       
1,417.20  
            
810.68  
         
1,310.40  
         
1,375.92  
         
1,417.20  
         
1,459.72  
Deferred Tax Assets, Long Term 
                         
-    
            
492.70  
               
83.00  
            
166.20  - - - - - 
Other Intangibles 
       
2,317.70  
       
2,294.40  
       
3,007.30  
       
3,139.50  - - - - - 
Other Long-Term Assets 
       
5,744.30  
            
996.20  
       
1,866.50  
       
2,543.80  - - - - - 
TOTAL ASSETS 
    
39,899.90  
    
33,328.80  
    
36,409.20  
    
38,307.70  - - - - - 
LIABILITIES & EQUITY 
        
Accounts Payable 
            
734.90  
            
566.20  
            
645.70  
            
774.00  
            
397.17  
             
405.45  
             
425.72  
             
438.49  
             
451.65  
Accrued Expenses 
       
1,622.10  
       
1,657.70  
       
1,776.00  
       
2,061.80  
       
2,206.13  
         
2,316.43  
         
2,432.25  
         
2,505.22  
         
2,580.38  
Current Portion Of Long-Term 
Debt/Capital Lease 
       
1,202.80  
       
1,171.20  
            
760.70  
            
906.70  
            
293.60  
                
16.20  
             
400.00  
         
2,922.70  
         
4,736.00  
Current Portion Of Capital Lease 
Obligations 
                         
-    
                         
-    
                         
-    
 
               
69.90  
                
75.40  
                
74.10  
                
75.20  
                
77.00  
Other Current Liabilities, Total 
               
89.70  
               
23.60  
            
138.70  
               
26.70  - - - - - 
Unearned Revenue, Current 
            
886.40  
            
869.80  
            
847.60  
            
849.70  
            
772.28  
             
695.05  
             
486.54  
             
250.57  
             
129.04  
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 
       
4,535.90  
       
4,289.90  
       
4,169.80  
       
4,620.30  
       
3,739.08  
         
3,508.53  
         
3,818.61  
         
6,192.18  




2009  2010  2011  2012 2013  2014   2015 2016  2017  
Long-Term 
Debt       26,531.80        23,628.90        26,278.80  
      
27,997.60  
      
29,491.61  
      
31,258.27  
      
30,561.73  
      
27,729.41  
         
25,609.59  
Capital Leases 
                           
-    
                           
-    
                           
-    
         
1,319.70  
         
1,244.30  
         
1,170.20  
         
1,095.00  
         
1,018.00  
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Appendix L: Liberty Global Inc Cash Flow Maps (in $million) 
Historic Forecast 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
          Intangible asset 
amort 
 




0% 17% -1% -3% -7% -14% -37% 
Depreciation 
 




11% 8% -1% -3% -7% -14% -37% 
Total Dep & Amort 
1,991.3
0 2,251.50 2,457.00 2,691.27 2,660.83 2,570.63 2,391.93 2,068.35 1,296.59 
 
yoy 13% 9% 10% -1% -3% -7% -14% -37% 
Intangible/Total Dep&Amort. 18% 17% 17.74% 18% 18% 17% 17% 17% 
change in NPPE 
 
-898.40        1,756.10              569.20  
             
(19.66)             152.60              724.29  
            
476.14            1,252.70  
Capex 
1,591.4
0 1,690.50 1,927.00 1,883.60 2,169.17 2,267.23 2,691.92 2,177.58 2,319.29 
Capex/Revenue 
    
19.66% 19.6% 22% 17.4% 18.0% 
Capex yoy 
    
5% 19% -19% 7% -100% 
          
NWC 
 
       
1,142.80  
          
(394.70) 
          
(894.50)      (1,130.54) 
          
(750.15) 
          
(900.98)      (3,153.89) 
        
(4,808.24) 
∆NWC 
    
          (236.04)             380.39  
          
(150.83)      (2,252.91) 




Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year5+  
FCF 
    
TV 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
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Appendix M: Virgin Media Inc. Income Statement (in £ million) 
Historic Forecast 
  
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 CAGR (2013-17) 





6% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Consumer 
 





6% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 
Business 
 





3% 7% 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 





3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Consumer 
 





3% 4% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% 
Business 
 





2% 6% 15% 13% 11% 9% 7% 7% 8% 





3% -4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 





8% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 





1% 1% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 





-3% -8% -9% 13% -3% -10% -9% -8% -7% 
Other Operating Expenses 0 0 -77.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 





-2% -9% 1% 8% -1% -5% -4% -3% -3% 





112% 67% 12% -6% 17% 24% 19% 14% 18% 





5% -8% -10% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% 
Interest And Investment Income 6.2 8.3 5 6.8 43.91 70.07 68.36 66.66 90.54 
 
NET INTEREST EXPENSE -448.9 -469.5 -435.8 -391.7 -352.53 -324.33 -324.00 -323.68 -297.78 
 
   
5% -7% -10% -10% -8% 0% 0% -8% -4% 
Income (Loss) On Equity Investments 14.1 24 18.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Currency Exchange Gains (Loss) 119 -34.1 -2.4 -6.3 
 
0 0 0 0 
 





-84% 173% -392% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
EBT, EXCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS -253.2 -123.3 155.9 451.9 473.24 629.17 835.14 1034.15 1239.15 
 





0.31 -0.84 -0.68 0.60 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
 
Gain (Loss) On Sale Of Investments 0 0 -7.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Other Unusual Items, Total -59.2 -117 -47.2 -187.8 -37.56 -15.02 -6.01 -2.40 -0.96 
 
   
0.98 -0.60 2.98 -0.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
 
EBT, INCLUDING UNUSUAL ITEMS -352.8 -293.3 93.1 261.4 435.68 614.15 829.13 1031.74 1238.19 30% 
 





-17% -132% 181% 67% 41% 35% 24% 20% 
 
Income Tax Expense 2.5 124.1 -16 2,591.20 696.18 128.97 165.83 206.35 247.64 
 
Carry forward +EBT 
    
3,026.88 
     
Earnings From Continuing Operations -350.3 -169.2 77.1 2,852.60 2,330.70 485.18 663.30 825.39 990.55 -19% 
   
-52% -146% 3600% -18% -79% 37% 24% 20% 
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Appendix N: Virgin Media Inc. Balance Sheet (in £ million) 
Historic Forecast 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cash And Equivalents 430.5 479.5 300.4 206.3 - - - - - 
Trading Asset Securities -- -- 7.8 6.1 - - - - - 
TOTAL CASH AND SHORT TERM INVESTMENTS 430.5 479.5 308.2 212.4 - - - - - 
Accounts Receivable 403.1 431.2 435.4 443.8 463.34 475.95 488.92 502.23 515.90 
Inventory 12.9 26.4 13.1 17.5 16.45 16.61 16.77 16.93 17.10 
Prepaid Expenses 95 89 83.9 85.7 - - - - - 
Other Current Assets 155 0.8 1.7 -- - - - - - 
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 1,102.50 1,029.10 844.2 814.2 479.79 492.56 505.69 519.16 533.00 
NET PROPERTY PLANT AND EQUIPMENT 5,045.80 4,763.10 4,602.70 4,512.20 4348.8251 4191.3655 4108.9533 4028.1615 4031.71536 
Growth 
 
-6% -3% -2% -4% -4% -2% -2% 0% 
Long-Term Investments 593.1 561.9 209.7 159.2 - - - - - 
Goodwill 2,017.80 2,017.50 2,017.50 2,017.50 - - - - - 
Other Intangibles 265.9 118.4 -- -- - - - - - 
Other Long-Term Assets 52.7 244.6 189 353.6 - - - - - 
TOTAL ASSETS 9,190.00 8,833.20 7,938.80 10,504.30 - - - - - 
          
LIABILITIES & EQUITY 
        
Accounts Payable 312.5 295.9 304.4 349.3 352.69 356.11 359.56 363.05 366.57 
Accrued Expenses 598 606.6 568.3 472.8 485.67 498.90 512.49 526.44 540.78 
Current Portion Of Long-Term Debt/Capital Lease 56.3 235.4 93.3 85.2 0.00 0 750 0.00 0.00 
Other Current Liabilities 143.8 57.6 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 1,393.40 1,497.20 1,277.80 1,224.00 838.36 855.01 1,622.05 889.49 907.35 
 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Long-Term Debt 6,040.30 5,860.30 5,832.10 5,802.00 5,801.89 5,771.95 4,992.16 5,712.52 5,683.04 
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Appendix O: Virgin Media Inc. Cash Flow Maps (in £ million) 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Amortization 183.70 147.00 118.40 0.00 200.00 161.09 129.75 104.50 84.17 
 
yoy -20% -19% -100% - -19% -19% -19% -19% 
Depreciation 988.10 988.30 923.20 951.70 872.28 884.03 814.65 750.71 706.29 
 
yoy 0% -7% 3% -8% 1% -8% -8% -6% 
Total Dep&Amort. 1,171.80 1,135.30 1,041.60 951.70 1,072.28 1,045.12 944.40 855.22 790.47 
Dep/NPPE 20% 21% 20% 21% 20% 19% 18% 16% 15% 
 
yoy 6% -3% 5% -6% -6% -6% -6% -6% 
Change in NPPE -282.70 -160.40 -90.50 -163.37 -157.46 -82.41 -80.79 3.55 
Capex 
 




8% 13% -18% 2% 1% -9% 6% 
Capex/Revenue 
   
17% 17% 16% 15% 15% 
NWC 
   
-409.80 -358.57 -362.44 -1,116.36 -370.33 -374.34 
∆NWC 
    
51.23 -3.87 -753.92 746.03 -4.02 
 
 
Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year5+ 
FCF 
    
TV 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 
822.55 934.12 1,735.69 352.06 1,123.37 34109.70 
      
Forecast rates 
    
 £              1.56   £              1.58   £              1.59   £              1.61   £              1.62  
 
      
Converted Cashflows 
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Appendix P: Potential Synergies in Continental Europe 
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Appendix Q: Valuation of the Merged Firm Summary 1 (values in $million) 
 
LGI VMED Combined TargetLGI TargetVMED Combined 
Growth 3% 3% 3% 
   
Tax rate 27% 21% 
    
       
Initial Revenues 2012 10,310.80 6,348.80 16,659.60 
   
CoGS 35% 40% 37% 
   
 
3,617.50 2,522.49 6,139.99 
   
Equity MV 2,210.00 4,888.91 7,098.91 
   
Debt MV 27,997.60 5,802.00 33,799.60 
   
weightsdebt 0.84 0.16 1.00 
   
Capital 30,207.60 10,690.91 40,898.51 
   
Debt-capital 93% 54% 86% 60% 40% 57% 
Equity-capital 7% 46% 14% 40% 60% 43% 
D/E 1266.86% 118.68% 634.18% 150.00% 66.67% 131.04% 
Cost of Distress 1.10% 0.80% 0.986% 




Value in $million 80,770.26 34,888.99 115,659.25 
weights 0.70 0.30 1.00 
All equity 69,763.33 32,428.54 102,191.87 
weights 0.68 0.32 1.00 
βu 0.96 0.96 0.96 
βl 1.7616 1.232 1.75 
ka 8% 6% 8% 
ke 12% 7% 9% 
kd 5.99% 6.83% 6.13% 
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Appendix R: Valuation of the Merged Firm Summary 2 (values in $million) 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TV 
 
 
Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year5+ 
 
FCFLGI             2,418.71           1,947.45           2,202.01           4,855.56           4,036.91  
  
FCFVMED             1,285.81           1,474.26           2,765.70               566.37           1,824.61  
  
FCFcombined             3,704.52           3,421.71           4,967.70           5,421.94           5,861.52      122,760.69  
 
PV             3,432.72           2,938.02           3,952.52           3,997.41           4,004.43         83,866.76  
 
 
      102,191.87  
      
        
ITS LGI                 469.90               498.05               486.95               441.82               408.05         14,056.50   TV  
ITS VMED                 141.12               128.18               105.58               120.82               120.20            3,232.40        17,394.93  
ITS Combined                 611.02               626.23               592.54               562.64               528.24         17,288.90  
 
 
                575.74               556.00               495.71               443.52               392.36  
 
      12,920.39  
PVITS          15,383.71  
      
Adjusted  PVITS          14,514.53  
      
        
Enterprise Value      $ 115,699.12  million 
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Appendix S: Valuation of the Merged Firm with Synergies Summary ( in $million) 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Without Synergies 
RevenueLGI 11,032.56 11,584.18 12,163.39 12,528.29 12,904.14 
RevenueVMED 6,521.69 6,699.28 6,881.71 7,069.10 7,261.60 
RevenueMerged 17,554.24 18,283.46 19,045.10 19,597.39 20,165.74 
CoGSLGI 3,971.72 4,054.46 4,257.19 4,384.90 4,516.45 
CoGSVMED 2,546.95 2,571.66 2,596.60 2,621.78 2,647.21 
CoGSMerged 6,518.68 6,626.12 6,853.79 7,006.68 7,163.66 
CoGS/Revenue 0.371344689 0.36241063 0.35987137 0.35753143 0.35523907 
      
With Cost Synergies 
CoGSMerged 6319.53 6399.21 6665.78 6859.09 6856.35 
CoGS/Revenue 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 
yoy 
 
-3% 0 0 -3% 
CoGS change -3% -3% -3% -2% -4% 
Gross Profit 11,234.72 11,884.25 12,379.31 12,738.31 13,309.39 
SGA 3,384.40 3,511.61 3,644.45 3,736.96 3,831.96 
SGA/Revenue 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Depreciation&Amort 4,321.04 4,188.79 3,854.14 3,392.48 2,520.47 
Expenses total 7,705.44 7,700.40 7,498.59 7,129.44 6,352.43 
Operating Income 3,529.27 4,183.85 4,880.73 5,608.87 6,956.96 
      
CapexLGI 2,169.17 2,267.23 2,691.92 2,177.58 2,319.29 
CapexVMED 1097.60 1124.95 1133.72 1037.24 1099.06 
CapexMerger 3,266.76 3,392.18 3,825.65 3,214.82 3,418.35 
∆NWCLGI               (236.04)              380.39             (150.83)        (2,252.91)           (1,654.4) 
∆NWCVMED 79.31 -5.99 -1167.29 1155.08 -6.22 
∆NWCMerger                  (156.7)                 374.4            (1,318.1)           (1,097.8)           (1,660.6) 
FCF                3,865.0              3,610.3              5,090.1              5,577.5              6,098.7  
TV 
    
125632.84 
PV 3578.73 3095.25 4040.71 4099.62 4150.66 
PVTV 
    
85503.60 
Total 104468.57 
    
PVITS 14514.53 
    
Value with Synergy 118,983.10 
    
Synergy 3,323.86 
    
PV 2399.09 
    
      
With Tax Synergies 
      
FCFs             3,857.60           3,628.11           5,342.64           5,707.89           6,235.88  
TV 
    
   128,459.11  
PV             3,571.85           3,110.52           4,241.16           4,195.47           4,244.03  
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PVTV 
    
      87,427.11  
Total       106,790.14  
    
ITS                 497.43               476.52               435.74               409.86               383.51  
TV 
    
      12,629.04  
PVITS                 468.71               423.08               364.53               323.08               284.86  
PVTV 
    
         9,380.44  
PVITS          11,583.50  
    
Adjusted PVITS          10,992.74  
    
Value with Synergy       117,782.88  
    
synergy             2,123.64  
    
PV             1,532.80  
    
      
      
With CapEx Savings 
      
CoGS 6,518.68 6,626.12 6,853.79 7,006.68 7,163.66 
Gross Profit 11,035.57 11,657.34 12,191.31 12,590.71 13,002.08 
SGA 3,384.40 3,511.61 3,644.45 3,736.96 3,831.96 
 Dep&Amort  4,214.04 4,087.64 3,551.84 3,313.24 2,328.64 
Expenses total 7,598.44 7,599.24 7,196.28 7,050.20 6,160.60 
Operating Income 3,437.13 4,058.10 4,995.03 5,540.51 6,841.48 
Capex 3,159.76 3,291.02 3,523.34 3,135.58 3,226.52 
 FCF  3,795.73 3,514.48 5,177.80 5,525.06 6,010.11 
 TV  
    
123,808.27 
PV 3,514.56 3,013.10 4,110.31 4,061.08 4,090.38 
PVTV 
    
84,261.83 
Total 103,051.26 
    
      
PVITS 14,514.53 
    
Value with Synergy 117,565.79 
    
Synergy 1,906.55 
    
PV 1,376.10 
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